Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bradbury, JC; Crain, WM
• 署名单位: George Mason University; University System of Georgia; North Georgia College & State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00150-X
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 309-325
• 关键词: law of 1/n; logrolling; national legislatures; Government spending; bicameralism

摘要

The Law of 1/n posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives fuels excessive government spending. Despite its wide acceptance as a stylized fact, the Law of 1/n has received only limited empirical scrutiny, and the existing evidence for the American States provides mixed support for the thesis. This paper examines the Law of I In in bicameral and unicameral legislative structures using a cross-section of democratic countries. The results indicate that legislative size matters under both legislature structures, but bicameralism dampens the 1/n effect relative to unicameralism. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.