Self-enforcing reciprocity norms and intergenerational transfers: theory and evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guttman, JM
• 署名单位: Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00105-5
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 117-151
• 关键词: cooperation; social norms; RECIPROCITY; reputation; intergenerational transfers

摘要

This paper presents a model of the emergence of cooperative social norms in a society composed exclusively of rational agents. Following Kreps et al. [Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., Wilson, R., 1982. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245-252], opportunistic agents are assumed to uphold cooperative norms in order to maintain reputations for being trustworthy - reputations which are necessary in order to find partners in mutually beneficial market and non-market transactions. Unlike the model of Kreps et al. [Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., Wilson, R., 1982. Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27, 245-252], however, the present model endogenizes agents' prior beliefs regarding their partners' type, rather than introducing these priors by assumption. The model is supported by evidence from an international micro-data set on family behavior. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.