Catching the agent on the wrong foot:: ex post choice of monitoring
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Khalil, F; Lawarrée, J
署名单位：
University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0047-2727
DOI：
10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00148-1
发表日期：
2001
页码：
327-347
关键词：
摘要：
In a principal-agent model with multiple performance measures, we show that the principal benefits by choosing ex post which variables will be monitored. If it is too costly for one type of agent to mimic all performance measures expected from another type, the principal can hope to catch the agent on the wrong foot if the agent tries to misrepresent his type. For cases of small asymmetry of information, the principal can implement the first best contract. For more serious asymmetries of information, the first best is not implementable. Then the low type may be required to overproduce, which is in contrast to the traditional result of second best contracting. We also obtain a ranking of monitoring instruments according to the frequency of their use. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science BV All rights reserved.
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