Corruption and optimal law enforcement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Polinsky, AM; Shavell, S
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0047-2727
• DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00127-4
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 1-24
• 关键词: corruption; BRIBERY; extortion; framing; crime control

摘要

We analyze corruption in law enforcement: the payment of bribes to enforcement agents, threats to frame innocent individuals in order to extort money from them, and the actual framing of innocent individuals. Bribery, extortion, and framing reduce deterrence and are thus worth discouraging. Optimal penalties for bribery and framing are maximal, but, surprisingly, extortion should not be sanctioned. The state may also combat corruption by paying rewards to enforcement agents for reporting violations. Such rewards can partially or completely mitigate the problem of bribery, but they encourage framing. The optimal reward may be relatively low to discourage extortion and framing, or relatively high to discourage bribery. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.