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作者：Sillamaa, MA; Veall, MR
作者单位：McMaster University; Statistics Canada
摘要：Federal tax reform in 1988 flattened the Canadian personal income tax schedule, changing the marginal tax rates for many individuals. Using methods similar to those applied by Auten and Carroll [Rev. Econ. 81(4) (1999) 681] in the study of the effects of the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act, we estimate the responsiveness of income to changes in taxes to be substantially smaller in Canada. However we find evidence of a much higher response in self-employment income, in the labor income of seniors and ...
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作者：Croxson, B; Propper, C; Perkins, A
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of Bristol; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：The 1991 reforms to the UK NHS created a group of buyers of hospital care from amongst primary care physicians. The implementation of the reforms was such that these buyers had incentives to increase their use of hospital services prior to entering the scheme in order to inflate their budgets. It has been argued that non-financial motives would limit such behaviour. The paper shows that these health care providers did respond to the financial incentives offered by the scheme, increasing hospit...
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作者：Pirttilä, J; Tuomala, M
作者单位：Tampere University; Bank of Finland
摘要：Using the self-selection approach to tax analysis within an OLG framework, the paper examines optimal non-linear labour and capital income taxation and the provision of a durable public good. Under endogenous wages, the marginal tax rules depend on the influence of the tax instruments on self-selection and on the income earning abilities of the households. In particular, we found that production inefficiency occurs in the model, justifying capital income taxation. For the public good, the pape...
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作者：Kirschsteiger, G; Prat, A
作者单位：Tilburg University; University of Vienna; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Lobbying is often represented as a common agency game. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identified by Bernheim and Whinston [Quarterly Journal of Economics 1986;101(1):1-31]. In this paper, we identify another class of equilibria, which we call natural, in which each principal offers a positive contribution on at most one alternative. We run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a dif...
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作者：Ottaviani, M; Sorensen, P
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; University of Copenhagen
摘要：Privately informed individuals speak openly in front of other members of a committee about the desirability of a public decision. Each individual wishes to appear well informed. For any given order of speech, committee members may herd by suppressing their true information. With individuals of heterogeneous expertise, optimizing over the order of speech can improve the extraction of information, but not perfectly so. It is not always optimal to use the common anti-seniority rule whereby expert...
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作者：Anderson, SP; de Palma, A; Kreider, B
作者单位：University of Virginia; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：This paper considers the relative efficiency of ad valorem and unit taxes in imperfectly competitive markets. We provide a simple proof that ad valorem taxes are welfare-superior to unit taxes in the short run when production costs are identical across firms. The proof covers differentiated products and a wide range of market conduct. Cost asymmetries strengthen the case for ad valorem taxation under Cournot competition, but unit taxation may be welfare-superior under Bertrand competition with...
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作者：Hess, GD; Orphanides, A
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Oberlin College; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：This paper investigates the relationship between the business cycle, the election cycle, and the timing and magnitude of foreign conflict. We propose a theoretical model which suggests that in the presence of a reelection motive, the frequency of war will be greater following recessions than otherwise. However, if partially benevolent leaders can influence the size of conflicts, then the consequences may be limited to conflicts of relatively small magnitude. We test the predictions of the theo...
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作者：Blackorby, C; Bossert, W; Donaldson, D
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Universite de Montreal
摘要：This note provides a corrected version of a representation theorem in population ethics. While it is true that the fixed-population axioms continuity and weak Pareto are sufficient for the existence of an ordering of population-size - representative-utility pairs that can be used to rank social alternatives, we show that, in order to obtain the existence of a real-valued representation, continuity must be strengthened. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bernheim, BD; Garrett, DM; Maki, DM
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA
摘要：Over the last 40 years, a majority of stares have adopted consumer education policies, and a sizable minority have mandated that high school students receive instruction on topics related to household financial decision-making. In this paper, we attempt to determine whether these mandates have had any effect on subsequent decisions. We exploit the variation in requirements both across states and over time to identify the effects of interest. The evidence indicates that mandates have raised bot...
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作者：Picard, PM
作者单位：University of Manchester
摘要：This paper links the old literature on employment subsidies with the current theories of contract and regulation. One important source of inefficiency of employment subsidies is non-additional employment and deadweight spending which occur when private firms receive a subsidy for jobs that would have been created without the subsidy. We identify the asymmetry of information between the government and the private firm as the source of these problems. When the government proposes optimal incenti...
