Large strategic dynamic interactions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kalai, Ehud; Shmaya, Eran
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.001
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 59-81
• 关键词: Anonymous games; Nash equilibrium; repeated games; Large games; Bayesian equilibrium; Markov equilibrium

摘要

The paper presents a model of large strategic dynamic interactions in an environment with uncertain fundamentals. The interaction is among a large finite group of interdependent players, diversified in their preferences and information. We study an imagined-continuum equilibrium, a behavioral hybrid of games with a continuum of players and finite games. This equilibrium enables simple Bayesian reasoning and admits natural Markov-perfect equilibria. In addition, we establish bounds on the probabilistic discrepancies between players' beliefs that are derived from the continuum model and the actual finite reality. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.