Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Che, Yeon-Koo; Condorelli, Daniele; Kim, Jinwoo
• 署名单位: Columbia University; University of Essex; Seoul National University (SNU)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.005
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 398-435
• 关键词: Weak cartels; Weakly collusion-proof auctions; Optimal auctions

摘要

We study private value auctions in which bidders may collude without using side-payments. In our model, bidders coordinate their actions to achieve an outcome that interim-Pareto dominates the noncooperative outcome. We characterize auctions that are collusion-proof in the sense that no such coordination opportunities exist, and show that the efficient and revenue maximizing auctions are not collusion-proof unless all bidders exhibit a concave distribution of valuations. We then solve for revenue maximizing collusion-proof auctions. If distributions of valuations are symmetric and single-peaked, the optimal selling mechanism is a standard auction with a minimum bid, followed by sequential negotiation in case no bidder bids above the minimum bid. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.