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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：The belief-weighted Nash social welfare functions are methods for aggregating Savage preferences defined over a set of acts. Each such method works as follows. Fix a 0-normalized subjective expected utility representation of every possible preference and assign a vector of individual weights to each profile of beliefs. To compute the social preference at a given preference profile, rank the acts according to the weighted product of the individual 0-normalized subjective expected utilities they...
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作者：De Castro, Luciano; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Iowa
摘要：A fundamental result of modern economics is the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility, that is, the fact that some Pareto optimal (efficient) allocations are not incentive compatible. This conflict has generated a huge literature, which almost always assumes that individuals are expected utility maximizers. What happens if they have other kind of preferences? Is there any preference where this conflict does not exist? Can we characterize those preferences? We show that in an ...
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作者：Gossner, Olivier; Steiner, Jakub
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Zurich; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：In a choice model, we characterize the loss induced by misperceptions of payoff-relevant parameters across a distribution of decision problems. When the agent cannot avoid misperceptions but has some control over the distribution of errors, we show that strategies that minimize loss from misperception exhibit systematic biases, akin to some documented in the behavioral and psychological literatures. We include illusion of control, order effect, overprecision, and overweighting of small probabi...
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作者：Mertikopoulos, Panayotis; Sandholm, William H.
作者单位：Inria; Communaute Universite Grenoble Alpes; Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble; Universite Grenoble Alpes (UGA); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study a class of evolutionary game dynamics defined by balancing a gain determined by the game's payoffs against a cost of motion that captures the difficulty with which the population moves between states. Costs of motion are represented by a Riemannian metric, i.e., a state-dependent inner product on the set of population states. The replicator dynamics and the (Euclidean) projection dynamics are the archetypal examples of the class we study. Like these representative dynamics, all Rieman...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：The paper considers a matching with contracts model in the presence of price controls. The model contains two important streams in the matching literature, those with and those without monetary transfers, as special cases. An adjustment process that ends with a stable outcome is presented. The paper presents a notion of competitive equilibrium, called Dreze equilibrium, and shows Dreze equilibrium allocations to be equivalent to allocations induced by stable outcomes. We therefore have an equi...
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作者：Yu, Edison G.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
摘要：This paper studies information aggregation in financial markets with recurrent investor exit and entry. I consider a dynamic general equilibrium model of asset trading with private information and collateral constraints. Investors differ in their aversion to Knightian uncertainty: When uncertainty is high, some investors exit the market. Since exiting investors' information is not fully revealed by prices, conditional return volatility and risk premia both increase. The model also implies that...
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作者：Macera, Rosario
作者单位：Universidad de los Andes - Chile
摘要：This paper studies the intertemporal allocation of incentives in a repeated moral hazard model where the loss averse agent experiences today utility from changes in their expectations about present and future wages and effort. In contrast to the standard prediction, under mild restrictions over the utility function, uncertainty is fully deferred into future payments allowing the principal to pay fixed wages. Although the intertemporal allocation of incentives is nonstandard, the optimal contra...
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作者：Balbus, Lukasz; Reffett, Kevin; Wozny, Lukasz
作者单位：University of Zielona Gora; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Warsaw School of Economics
摘要：We give a set of sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a time-consistent stationary Markov consumption policy for a quasi-hyperbolic household under uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, this uniqueness result is the first presented in the literature for general settings, i.e. under standard assumptions on preferences, as well as some new condition on a transition probability. This paper advocates a generalized Bellman equation method to overcome some predicaments of the known methods a...
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作者：Bidder, R. M.; Smith, M. E.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco
摘要：Consumption-based asset-pricing models have experienced success in recent years by augmenting the consumption process in 'exotic' ways. Two notable examples are the Long-Run Risk and rare disaster frameworks. Such models are difficult to characterize from consumption data alone. Accordingly, concerns have been raised regarding their specification. Acknowledging that both phenomena are naturally subject to ambiguity, we show that an ambiguity-averse agent may behave as if Long-Run Risk and disa...
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作者：Liu, Feng; Conlon, John R.
作者单位：University of Mississippi
摘要：We show that there exist models with rational agents, three periods, and five states of the world, which have a strong bubble in one of these states. However, no finite-horizon rational strong bubble model, with standard Walrasian markets, can have fewer than five states. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
