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作者：d'Albis, Hippolyte; Greulich, Angela; Ponthiere, Gregory
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Universite Gustave-Eiffel; Universite Paris-Est-Creteil-Val-de-Marne (UPEC); Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：During the last century, fertility has exhibited, in industrialized economies, two distinct trends: the cohort total fertility rate follows a decreasing pattern, while the cohort average age at motherhood exhibits a U-shaped pattern. This paper proposes a Unified Growth Theory aimed at rationalizing those two demographic stylized facts. We develop a three-period OLG model with two periods of fertility, and show how a traditional economy, where individuals do not invest in education, and where ...
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作者：Gobbi, Paula E.
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：This paper proposes a semi-cooperative marital decision process to explain parental underinvestment in childcare. First, parents collectively choose the amount of labor to supply and, in a second step, they each choose the amount of childcare as the outcome of a Cournot game. Non-cooperative behavior stems from the lack of a credible commitment between spouses regarding the amount of childcare they each supply. The theoretical model is able to reproduce the fact that parental time with childre...
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作者：Tomoeda, Kentaro
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney
摘要：In matching problems with minimum and maximum type-specific quotas, there may not exist a stable (i.e., fair and non-wasteful) assignment (Ehlers et al., 2014). This paper investigates the structure of schools' priority rankings which guarantees stability. First, we show that there always exists a fair and non-wasteful assignment if for each type of students, schools have common priority rankings over a certain number of bottom students. Next, we show that the pairwise version of this conditio...
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作者：Dogan, Battal; Dogan, Serhat; Yildiz, Kemal
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：We introduce and analyze an efficiency criterion for probabilistic assignment of objects, when only ordinal preference information is available. This efficiency criterion is based on the following domination relation: a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if it is ex-ante efficient for a strictly larger set of utility profiles consistent with the ordinal preferences. We provide a simple characterization of this domination relation. We revisit an extensively studied assignment...
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作者：Norman, Thomas W. L.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：It is shown that, in infinitely-repeated games between two arbitrarily patient players, strategy profiles with inefficient pure stage-Nash continuations are not strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). By contrast, a set of strategy profiles similar to the Prisoners' Dilemma's perfect tit-for-tat is uniformly robust to perfect entrants (Swinkels, 1992), and hence contains a strategically stable set. Moreover, this set satisfies iterated dominance and a version of forward induction, w...
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作者：Bethune, Zachary; Hu, Tai-Wei; Rocheteau, Guillaume
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Bristol; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We characterize the equilibrium set of a two-good, pure-credit economy with limited commitment, under both pairwise and centralized meetings. We show that the set of equilibria derived under not-too-tight solvency constraints (Alvarez and Jermann, 2000) commonly used in the literature is of measure zero in the whole set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. There exist a continuum of stationary equilibria, a continuum of endogenous credit cycles of any periodicity, and a continuum of sunspot equilib...
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作者：Liu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng; Wang, Ruqu; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; National University of Singapore; Zhejiang University; Queens University - Canada; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：In this paper, we analyze the role of negative prizes in contest design with a fixed budget, risk-neutral contestants, and independent private abilities. The effort-maximizing prize allocation rule features a threshold. When the highest effort is above the threshold, all contestants with lower efforts receive negative prizes. These negative prizes are used to augment the prize to the contestant with the highest effort, which better incentivizes contestants with higher abilities. When no contes...
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作者：Foss, Sergey; Shneer, Vsevolod; Thomas, Jonathan P.; Worrall, Tim
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; Heriot Watt University; Heriot Watt University; Russian Academy of Sciences; Sobolev Institute of Mathematics; Novosibirsk State University; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We introduce and analyze a new class of monotone stochastic recursions in a regenerative environment which is essentially broader than that of Markov chains. We prove stability theorems and apply our results to three canonical models in recursive economics, generalizing some known stability results to the cases when driving sequences are not independent and identically distributed. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Drozd, Lukasz A.; Serrano-Padial, Ricardo
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; Drexel University
摘要：We study the negative feedback loop between the aggregate default rate and the efficacy of enforcement in a model of debt-financed entrepreneurial activity. The novel feature of our model is that enforcement capacity is accumulated ex ante and thus subject to depletion ex post. We characterize the effect of shocks that deplete enforcement resources on the aggregate default rate and credit supply. In the model default decisions by entrepreneurs are strategic complements, leading to multiple equ...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kuebler, Dorothea; Kurino, Morimitsu
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Technical University of Berlin; Keio University
摘要：We study a college admissions problem in which colleges accept students by ranking students' efforts in entrance exams. Students' ability levels affect the cost of their efforts. We solve and compare equilibria of centralized college admissions (CCA) where students apply to all colleges and decentralized college admissions (DCA) where students only apply to one college. We show that lower ability students prefer DCA whereas higher ability students prefer CCA. Many predictions of the theory are...
