Sharing market access in buyer-seller networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Priazhkina, Sofia; Page, Frank H.
• 署名单位: Bank of Canada; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.017
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 415-446
• 关键词: Stable networks; Market sharing agreements; information sharing; bargaining

摘要

This paper presents a network formation game of buyers and sellers with market sharing. Prior to engaging in bargaining with buyers, sellers exchange access to buyers for negotiated payments to overcome search frictions. With homogeneous preferences, sharing increases market trade volume. Surprisingly, buyers benefit from sharing when sellers have stronger bargaining positions. With heterogeneous preferences, market sharing may decrease market trade volume. Also, when sellers have more bargaining power than buyers, trade volume weakly exceeds Walrasian level, thus causing overproduction by high-cost sellers. Buyers who value the good the least are squeezed out from the market as a result of sharing between sellers. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.