Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ashlagi, Itai; Gonczarowski, Yannai A.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.001
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 405-425
• 关键词: Stable matching; Obviously strategy-proof; Obvious strategy-proofness; matching; mechanism

摘要

Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a growing amount of empirical evidence reveals that applicants misrepresent their preferences when this mechanism is used. This paper shows that no mechanism that implements a stable matching is obviously strategy-proof for any side of the market, a stronger incentive property than strategy-proofness that was introduced by Li (2017). A stable mechanism that is obviously strategy-proof for applicants is introduced for the case in which agents on the other side have acyclical preferences. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.