Robust comparative statics for non-monotone shocks in large aggregative games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Camacho, Carmen; Kamihigashi, Takashi; Saglam, Cagri
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Kobe University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.12.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 288-299
• 关键词: Large aggregative games; Robust comparative statics; Positive shocks; stochastic dominance; Mean-preserving spreads

摘要

A policy change that involves a redistribution of income or wealth is typically controversial, affecting some people positively but others negatively. In this paper we extend the robust comparative statics result for large aggregative games established by Acemoglu and Jensen (2010) to possibly controversial policy changes. In particular, we show that both the smallest and the largest equilibrium values of an aggregate variable increase in response to a policy change to which individuals' reactions may be mixed but the overall aggregate response is positive. We provide sufficient conditions for such a policy change in terms of distributional changes in parameters. (C) 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.