Lies in disguise - A theoretical analysis of cheating

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dufwenberg, Martin; Dufwenberg, Martin A.
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.013
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 248-264
• 关键词: Cheating; Lying; COSTS; audience; Perceived cheating aversion; Psychological game theory

摘要

We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher and Follmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, referred to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived to cheat. A particular equilibrium, characterized by three intuitive properties, captures the stylized facts from many experiments (in particular the co-presence of selfish, honest, and partial-lie choices) well. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.