The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hashimoto, Tadashi
• 署名单位: Yeshiva University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.002
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 708-733
• 关键词: Ex post incentive compatibility; random allocation; Random priority; Large market; rational expectations equilibrium; information aggregation

摘要

This paper studies allocation problems with and without monetary transfers, such as combinatorial auctions, school choice, and course allocation. Interdependent values and multidimensional signals are allowed. Despite known negative results, a mechanism exists that is feasible, ex post individually rational, ex post incentive compatible, and asymptotically both efficient and envy-free. This mechanism is a special case of the generalized random priority mechanism (GRP), which always satisfies the first three properties. The asymptotic properties follow as a corollary of the main theorem: GRP approximates virtually any infinite-market mechanism in large finite markets. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.