Risky shifts as multi-sender signaling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Honryo, Takakazu
• 署名单位: University of Mannheim
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.003
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 273-287
• 关键词: Signaling game; Risky shifts

摘要

This paper addresses the issue of risky shifts by a multi-sender signaling game. Senders compete in making proposals to be adopted by a group, hence they try to signal that they have the ability to correctly observe the state. This paper shows that senders tend to avoid making a moderate proposal, because a moderate proposal signals incompetence. When facing a moderate and a risky proposal, the group tends to adopt the risky one, and we have risky shifts as a result. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.