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作者：Le Treust, Mael; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Information Sciences & Technologies (INS2I); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where the persuader and the decision maker communicate through an imperfect channel that has a fixed and limited number of messages and is subject to exogenous noise. We provide an upper bound on the payoffs the persuader can secure by communicating through the channel. We also show that the bound is tight, i.e., if the persuasion problem consists of a large number of independent copies of the same base problem, then the persuader can achieve this boun...
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作者：Arifovic, Jasmina; Hommes, Cars; Salle, Isabelle
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Bank of Canada
摘要：We set up a laboratory experiment to empirically investigate equilibrium selection in a complex economic environment. We use the overlapping-generation model of Grandmont (1985), which displays multiple perfect-foresight equilibria, including periodic and chaotic dynamics. The equilibrium selection problem is not solved under learning, as each outcome is predicted by at least one existing learning theory. We find that subjects in the lab systematically coordinate on an equilibrium despite the ...
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作者：Hart, Sergiu; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We consider the menu size of mechanisms as a measure of their complexity, and study how it relates to revenue extraction capabilities. Our setting has a single revenue-maximizing seller selling a number of goods to a single buyer whose private values for the goods are drawn from a possibly correlated known distribution, and whose valuation is additive over the goods. We show that when there are two (or more) goods, simple mechanisms of bounded menu size-such as selling the goods separately, or...
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作者：Name-Correa, Alvaro J.; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; Duke University
摘要：We examine the consequences of vote transparency in committees whose members fear being blamed by interested observers for casting an unfavorable vote. We show that while individually undesirable, such social pressure can improve the collective decision by mitigating a voting externality. Hence, organizations may adopt public voting when the fear of blame is too little, and secret voting when the fear is too much. We also show that public voting is particularly desirable in committees with ove...
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作者：Bich, Philippe
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：We introduce the new concept of prudent equilibrium to model strategic uncertainty, and prove it exists in large classes of discontinuous games. When the game is better-reply secure, we show that prudent equilibrium refines Nash equilibrium. In contrast with the current literature, we don't use probabilities to model players' strategies and beliefs about other players' strategies. We provide examples (first-price auctions, location game, Nash demand game, etc.) where prudent equilibrium concep...
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作者：Altermatt, Lukas
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Basel
摘要：This paper analyzes optimal monetary policy regarding asset markets in a model where money and savings are essential and asset markets matter. The model is able to explain why different regimes for the correlation of real interest rates and stock price-dividend ratios exist, and offers two explanations why the correlation vanished after 2007: A decrease in inflation or changes in the supply of risky and safe assets. The results on optimal policy show that away from the Friedman rule, fiscal po...
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作者：Carroll, Gabriel
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：A principal needs to make a decision, and contracts with an expert, who can obtain information relevant to the decision by exerting costly effort. The principal can incentivize effort by paying a reward based on the expert's reported information and on the true state of nature, which is revealed ex post. Both parties are financially risk-neutral, and payments are constrained by limited liability. The principal is uncertain about the expert's information acquisition technology: she knows some a...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Wang, Fan
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
摘要：Decision makers often stick to a status quo without explicitly reconsidering it. Yet, their observed choices might be compatible with a fully rational model. We ask when such a rationalization is possible. We assume as observable only the choice of sticking to the status quo vs. changing it, as a function of a database of cases. We state conditions on the set of databases that would make the decision maker change the status quo, which are equivalent to the following representation: the decisio...
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作者：Attar, Andrea; Campioni, Eloisa; Piaser, Gwenael
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Rome Tor Vergata; IPAG Business School
摘要：We study games in which principals simultaneously post mechanisms in the presence of several agents. We evaluate the role of principals' communication in these settings. As in Myerson (1982), each principal may generate incomplete information among agents by sending them private signals. We show that this channel of communication, which has not been considered in standard approaches to competing mechanisms, has relevant strategic effects. Specifically, we construct an example of a complete inf...
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作者：Davoodalhosseini, Seyed Mohammadreza
作者单位：Bank of Canada
摘要：This paper studies constrained efficiency in Guerrieri et al.'s (2010) model of adverse selection and directed search. Buyers post contracts, and sellers with private information about their type direct their search toward their preferred contract. Buyers and sellers then match bilaterally and trade. If the Guerrieri-Shimer-Wright equilibrium fails to achieve the first best, then the planner subject to the frictions of the environment achieves strictly higher welfare than the equilibrium, i.e....
