Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Kellner, Christian; Le Quement, Mark T.
• 署名单位: University of Southampton; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.007
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1-17
• 关键词: Cheap talk; ambiguity

摘要

This paper proposes a model of ambiguous language. We consider a simple cheap talk game in which a sender who faces an ambiguity averse receiver is able to perform ambiguous randomization, i.e. to randomize according to unknown probabilities. We show that for any standard influential communication equilibrium there exists an equilibrium featuring an ambiguous communication strategy which Pareto-dominates it in terms of consistent planning ex ante utilities. Ambiguity, by triggering worst-case decision-making by the receiver, shifts the latter's response to information towards the sender's ideal action, thus encouraging more information transmission. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.