Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baisa, Brian; Burkett, Justin
• 署名单位: Amherst College; Wake Forest University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.11.010
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 1-15
• 关键词: Auctions; Multi-unit auctions; market power; large auctions; Asymmetric first price auctions

摘要

We compare equilibrium bidding in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when a single large bidder (i.e., with multi-unit demand) competes against many small bidders, each with single-unit demands. We show that the large bidder prefers the discriminatory auction over the uniform-price auction, and we provide general conditions under which small bidders have the reverse preference. We use examples to show that the efficiency and revenue rankings of the two auctions are ambiguous. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.