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作者：McLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Standard mechanism design begins with a statement of the problem, including knowledge on the designer's part about the distribution of the characteristics (preferences and information) of the participants who are to engage with the mechanism. There is a large literature on robust mechanism design, much of which aims to reduce the assumed information the designer has about the participants. In this paper we provide an auction mechanism for interdependent value problems that performs well when t...
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作者：Chang, Hung-Chi; Li, Yiting
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Taiwan University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; National Taiwan University
摘要：This paper revisits Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) (GSW) to study screening in a competitive search market with adverse selection. GSW show that there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which each type applies to a different contract, and their key sorting assumption involves a single-crossing property on agents' preferences. We show that GSW's main results hold under a weaker assumption on preference heterogeneity, called generalized sorting, and weakening the sorting assumption ...
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作者：Brandt, Felix; Greger, Matthias; Segal-Halevi, Erel; Suksompong, Warut
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Ariel University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We consider the problem of funding public goods that are complementary in nature. Examples include charities handling different needs (e.g., protecting animals vs. providing healthcare), charitable donations to different individuals, or municipal units handling different issues (e.g., security vs. transportation). We model these complementarities by assuming Leontief preferences; that is, each donor seeks to maximize an individually weighted minimum of all contributions across the charities. D...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Gan, Tan; Li, Yingkai
作者单位：Yale University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study a sender-receiver game in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. We ask how the receiver should commit, in advance, to a rule that maps the information of the sender into decisions-when the receiver knows neither the sender's true preferences nor the full range of information the sender could supply. To handle this dual uncertainty, we adopt a unified robust framework that nests max-min utility, min-max regret, and min-max...
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作者：Agranov, Marina; Lopez-Moctezuma, Gabriel; Strack, Philipp; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University
摘要：We compare how well agents aggregate information in two repeated social learning environments. In the first setting agents have access to a public data set. In the second they have access to the same data, and also to the past actions of others. Despite the fact that actions contain no additional payoff-relevant information, and despite potential herd behavior, free riding and information overload issues, observing and imitating the actions of others leads agents to take the optimal action mor...
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作者：Krahmer, Daniel
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：The paper studies the canonical hold-up problem with one-sided investment by the buyer and full bargaining power by the seller. The buyer can covertly choose any distribution of valuations at a cost and privately observes her valuation. I show that, unlike in the well-understood case with linear costs, if investment costs are strictly convex, the buyer's equilibrium utility is strictly positive and total welfare is strictly higher than when valuations are public information, thus alleviating t...
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作者：Colombo, Luca V. A.; Femminis, Gianluca; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; Northwestern University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：How should firms be incentivized to invest efficiently (e.g., in AI or the supply of smart inputs) when such investments come with spillovers and their profitability depends on uncertain aggregate economic conditions? We show that firms can be encouraged to collect information and then use it in society's best interest through a subsidy that resembles a Pigouvian correction but accounts for the non-verifiability of firms' acquisition and usage of information.
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作者：Abdellaoui, M.; Hill, B.; Kemel, E.; Maafi, H.
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We investigate learning in ambiguous situations where subjects bet on a winning event whose probability depends on an unknown proportion of winning chips in an urn. Varying the number of draws prior to choice allows us to scan ambiguity attitudes across differing amounts of information. By separately eliciting posterior beliefs in addition to matching probabilities, we disentangle the impact of learning on ambiguity attitude from its impact on beliefs, including divergences from Bayesian updat...
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作者：He, Kevin; Libgober, Jonathan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Southern California
摘要：We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others' strategies. In equilibrium, each agent adopts the feasible belief that best fits their data and plays optimally given their beliefs. We define the stability of the resident model by comparing its equilibrium payoff with that of the entrant model, and provide...
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作者：Xu, Wenji
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper studies a sequential social learning model in which agents learn about an underlying state from others' actions. Unlike classic models, we consider a setting where agents may observe coarse signals of past actions. We identify a simple, necessary, and sufficient condition for asymptotic learning, called separability, which depends on both the information environment and the payoff structure. A necessary condition for separability is unbounded beliefs which requires agents' private i...
