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作者：Bougt, Daniel; Ghosh, Gagan; Liu, Heng
作者单位：Hanken School of Economics; California State University System; California State University Fullerton; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
摘要：We study the effect of ambiguity on expected revenue in multi-unit auctions where bidders have independent private values, maxmin preferences, and single-unit demand. If the set of priors is suitably rich, we show that the discriminatory or 'pay-as-bid' auction has the highest expected revenue, followed by the sequential first-price auction and then the sequential second-price auction. The uniform price auction with the 'highest losing bid' pricing rule does the worst. Our results also extend ...
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作者：Ellis, Andrew
摘要：In many choice problems, the interaction between several distinct variables determines the payoff of each alternative. I propose and axiomatize a model of a decision maker who recognizes that she may not accurately perceive the correlation between these variables, and who takes this into account when making her decision. She chooses as if she calculates each alternative's expected outcome under multiple possible correlation structures, and then evaluates it according to the worst expected outc...
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作者：Gu, Chao; Jiang, Janet Hua; Wang, Liang
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; Bank of Canada; University of Hawaii System
摘要：We construct a New Monetarist model with labor market search and identify two channels that affect the long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment. First, inflation lowers wages through bargaining because unemployed workers rely more heavily on cash transactions and suffer more from inflation than employed workers; this wage-bargaining channel generates a downward-sloping Phillips curve without assuming nominal rigidity. Second, inflation increases firms' financing costs, which di...
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作者：Delacretaz, David; Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio
作者单位：University of Manchester; University of Melbourne; University of Queensland
摘要：Lindahl prices, set by a fictitious auctioneer with full knowledge of values and costs, are a generalization of Walrasian prices. By making the efficient allocation utility-and profit-maximizing for all players, they induce an efficient outcome in a decentralized way even in the presence of public goods. We study a collective choice model with quasilinear utility, which encompasses the allocation of public and private goods as special cases. We show that each agent's most favorable Lindahl pay...
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作者：Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Deakin University
摘要：We study the problem of aggregating individual geometric discounting (GD) preferences over infinite streams of consumption profiles into a system specifying, for each consumption history, a social ranking of the streams that follow that history. Such a system is time-consistent if and only if it is generated by a single underlying preference ordering over the lifetime streams. Under the Weak Pareto Principle, Neutrality, Anonymity, and Discounting Irrelevance (individual discount factors do no...
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作者：Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed
作者单位：University of Miami; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
摘要：Financial arrangements involving illiquid assets financed by liquid liabilities are often viewed as inherently runnable. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that this is true when risk-sharing arrangements are not optimally designed. Peck and Shell (2003) and Ennis and Keister (2009, 2016), however, demonstrate that runnable banking arrangements can be constrained-efficient when liquidity demand is uncertain and withdrawals must be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. We show that this in...
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作者：Sethi, Rajiv; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Columbia University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：A defining feature of culture is similarity in the manner in which information is interpreted. This facilitates extraction of information from the beliefs of those in one's own group, a force for homophily. However, observation of individuals outside one's group deepens our understanding of their culture, counteracting this effect. We model this process, using unobservable, heterogeneous priors (correlated within but not across groups) to represent initial beliefs, and characterize long-run co...
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作者：Lu, Jingfeng; Zhao, Wenbo
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Jinan
摘要：This paper studies when and how intertemporal bundling arises in optimal dynamic selling mechanisms in a two-period setting, where two objects (A and B) are sequentially available for sale. When the buyer's values of the two objects (vA and vB respectively) are independent, in contrast to conventional insight from simultaneous sales, we find in our setting that there is no loss in relying on separate sales for optimal design. This result extends under widely adopted regularity conditions when ...
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作者：Perea, Andres
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：Within dynamic games we are interested in conditions on the players' preferences that imply dynamic consistency and the existence of sequentially optimal strategies. The latter means that the strategy is optimal at each of the player's information sets, given his beliefs there. To explore these properties we assume, following Gilboa and Schmeidler (2003) and Perea (2025a), that every player holds a conditional preference relation-a mapping that assigns to every probabilistic belief about the o...
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作者：Egger, Peter H.; Huang, Ruobing
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：A large body of theoretical and quantitative work concerns models of heterogeneous firms and monopolistic competition. But most of it relies on strong assumptions regarding demand structure, firm-productivity distribution, and country heterogeneity. This paper studies a general-equilibrium model with directly explicitly additive preferences, non-specified productivity distributions, and asymmetric countries, for which much less is known. We first prove the existence and uniqueness of the marke...
