Learning through imitation: An experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Agranov, Marina; Lopez-Moctezuma, Gabriel; Strack, Philipp; Tamuz, Omer
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106203
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Information cascades; Herd behavior; FOLLOW OTHERS; networks; neglect; CHOICE

摘要

We compare how well agents aggregate information in two repeated social learning environments. In the first setting agents have access to a public data set. In the second they have access to the same data, and also to the past actions of others. Despite the fact that actions contain no additional payoff-relevant information, and despite potential herd behavior, free riding and information overload issues, observing and imitating the actions of others leads agents to take the optimal action more often in the second setting. We also investigate the effect of group size, as well as a setting in which agents observe private data and others' actions.