Managing persuasion robustly: The optimality of quota rules
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Bergemann, Dirk; Gan, Tan; Li, Yingkai
署名单位：
Yale University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; National University of Singapore
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2026.106222
发表日期：
2026
关键词：
摘要：
We study a sender-receiver game in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. We ask how the receiver should commit, in advance, to a rule that maps the information of the sender into decisions-when the receiver knows neither the sender's true preferences nor the full range of information the sender could supply. To handle this dual uncertainty, we adopt a unified robust framework that nests max-min utility, min-max regret, and min-max competitive ratio as special cases. Across all criteria, the same answer emerges: the optimal rule is always a quota rule.