Investment subsidies with spillovers and endogenous private information: Why Pigou got it all right

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Colombo, Luca V. A.; Femminis, Gianluca; Pavan, Alessandro
• 署名单位: Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; Northwestern University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106160
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: increasing returns; simple-model; social value; taxation; COORDINATION; POLICY; aggregation; acquisition

摘要

How should firms be incentivized to invest efficiently (e.g., in AI or the supply of smart inputs) when such investments come with spillovers and their profitability depends on uncertain aggregate economic conditions? We show that firms can be encouraged to collect information and then use it in society's best interest through a subsidy that resembles a Pigouvian correction but accounts for the non-verifiability of firms' acquisition and usage of information.