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作者：Higashi, Youichiro; Hyogo, Kazuya; Takeoka, Norio
作者单位：Okayama University; Ryukoku University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We examine the behavioral foundation of rational inattention within a menu-choice framework. Unlike previous studies, our approach enables the unique identification of nonadditive information costs. The nonadditivity of information costs makes the effective cost inherently dependent on benefits of information. In contrast to additive cost models, this feature may lead to a violation of the preference for early resolution of menu uncertainty. Early resolution is typically preferable as it allow...
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作者：Perotti, Enrico; Terovitis, Spyros
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We study how a primary need for minimum safety affects investment choices. In addition to risky projects, agents may choose to invest in personal assets they can control. Investing in personal assets serves as self-insurance, as they ensure a higher minimum return but offer a lower expected return than the risky project offers. In autarky, investors ensure a minimum return by personal assets, besides investing in the risky project. Private intermediaries and a safe rate arise endogenously to l...
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作者：Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Baranov, Oleg
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is one of the most compelling constructs in mechanism design, but the presence of complementary goods creates the possibility of non-core and even zero-revenue outcomes. In this article, we show that joint feasibility constraints on allocations offer a second pathway to ill-behaved outcomes in the VCG mechanism, even when all bidders have substitutes preferences for the goods. We then develop a theory of complementarities specifically tailored to assig...
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作者：Cheung, Stan; Mariotti, Marco; Veneziani, Roberto
作者单位：Queen Mary University London; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：A Hard Problem is a collective choice problem in which the only feasible alternatives to the status quo consist of a welfare gain to some people (the Winners) and a welfare loss to others (the Losers). These problems are typical in a number of settings, such as climate action, anti-trust regulation, and tax design. We study how to make collective choices when faced with Hard Problems. We find that a relatively weak fairness requirement, which we call Expansion Solidarity, necessarily leads to ...
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作者：Leme, Renato Paes; Schneider, Jon; Zhang, Hanrui
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will play role when the primary utility of the outcomes is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is immune to strategic manipulation if and only if it is incentive compatible with regard to primary utility - a property we term primary incentive compatibility - and nonbossy a well-studied property in the context of matching and allocation mechanisms. We give complete characterizations of primarily incentive-...
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作者：Burkett, Justin; Woodward, Kyle
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Apple Inc
摘要：We consider the problem faced by a durable-good monopolist who can allocate a single good at any time, but is uncertain of a buyer's values and temporal preferences for receiving the good. We derive conditions under which it is optimal for the monopolist to ignore the uncertainty about the buyer's discount factor and allocate immediately via a single first-period price. Under one condition, the seller optimally offers a single first-period price if she would weakly raise this price upon learni...
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作者：Arce, Fernando; Bengui, Julien; Bianchi, Javier
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; Inter-American Development Bank; Swiss National Bank (SNB); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：In this paper, we revisit the scope for macroprudential policy in production economies with cuniary externalities and collateral constraints. We study competitive equilibria and constrained efficient equilibria and examine the extent to which the gap between the two depends on production structure and the policy instruments available to the planner. We argue that macro prudential policy is desirable regardless of whether the competitive equilibrium features more or less borrowing than the cons...
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作者：Gottardi, Piero; Maurin, Vincent; Monnet, Cyril
作者单位：University of Essex; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of Bern; Study Center Gerzensee
摘要：We study the effect of investment growth on firms' incentives under moral hazard. Adding value- increasing, but risky projects to a firm's portfolio can weaken incentives for safer ones, even when returns are independent. While the firm diversifies its sources of income, this risk contamination channel can increase its fragility. Such fragility is exacerbated in the presence of news about the value of investments. Firms can mitigate these effects by selecting safer new investments at the expen...
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作者：Min, Weicheng
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：This paper examines the impact of a recommender's career concerns on the long-term relationship with a consumer when the recommender has a private type in his expertise. An informed type's expertise is valuable for the consumer's ongoing purchasing decisions, whereas an uninformed type lacks such expertise and thus cannot mimic the informed type. I show that the uninformed type's reputation concerns never benefit the consumer and may lead to a complete market breakdown when they are sufficient...
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作者：Vorjohann, Pauline
作者单位：University of Exeter
摘要：I derive a model of choice bracketing from two behavioral axioms in an expected utility framework. The first behavioral axiom establishes a link between narrow bracketing and correlation neglect. The second behavioral axiom identifies the reference point as the connector between broad and narrow preferences. The narrow bracketer is characterized by an inability to process changes from the reference point in different dimensions simultaneously. As a result, her tradeoffs between dimensions are ...
