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作者：Lang, Xu; Yang, Zaifu
作者单位：Shandong University; University of Macau
摘要：We propose a condition under which a system of linear inequalities can be found to characterize ex post and interim allocation mechanisms that assign multiple heterogeneous indivisible objects to many agents and also satisfy complex distributional constraints in an incomplete information environment. This condition is called total unimodularity, a well-recognized and rich class of matrices whose entries are-1, 0, or 1. The condition is so general as to extend and unify a number of well-known r...
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作者：Anufriev, Mikhail; Deghi, Andrea; Panchenko, Valentyn; Pin, Paolo
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; Technical University of Ostrava; International Monetary Fund; University of New South Wales Sydney; University of Siena; Bocconi University
摘要：We develop a theoretical model of network formation in the overnight interbank market, where banks manage liquidity under reserve uncertainty by strategically forming bilateral lending relationships. The model incorporates counterparty risk and the central bank's corridor system, yielding endogenously determined equilibrium networks. A key result, relevant for systemic stability policy, is that the equilibrium network is bipartite: active banks act either as lenders or borrowers, and no strate...
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作者：Levine, David K.
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：I analyze a social evolutionary model in which there is a non-excludable public good that reduces the chances of catastrophe. I show that while resilient types that produce the public good cannot survive head-to-head competition with other more selfish types in a fixed population, they do if catastrophes reduce population.
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作者：Farboodi, Maryam; Jarosch, Gregor; Menzio, Guido; Wiriadinata, Ursula
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Duke University; New York University; International Monetary Fund
摘要：This paper shows that intermediation in asset markets may emerge exclusively because of rent extraction motives. Among dealers with heterogeneous bargaining skills, those with superior skills become intermediaries and constitute the core of the trading network, while those with inferior skills constitute the periphery. Intermediation is privately profitable because agents with superior bargaining skills can take positions and unwind them in the future at a better price than others could. Inter...
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作者：Chang, Dongkyu; Vong, Allen
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study a coordination game played by a large number of agents, who acquire private signals about a hidden state on a platform before choosing individual actions. The platform privately and imperfectly filters misinformation, improving the precision of these signals. We show that a platform with an ethical concern to proactively improve agents' welfare could perversely reduce their welfare by aggravating their disagreements about the state and in turn undermining coordination. We also show th...
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作者：Cao, Dan; L'Huillier, Jean-Paul; Yoo, Donghoon
作者单位：Georgetown University; Brandeis University; Korea University
摘要：A literature debates the explanations for the cyclical properties of emerging markets using either trend shocks (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007) or financial frictions (Neumeyer and Perri, 2004; Garcia-Cicco et al., 2010). We state a formal proposition that makes explicit the parametric assumptions needed for consumption to behave (exactly) as in a random-walk, permanent income model. The result is general and applies to economies with endogenous investment and production. The proposition offers a ...
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作者：Duque-Rosas, Eduardo; Pereyra, Juan S.; Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Universidad de Montevideo; Universidad de Chile
摘要：The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own. We show that this drawback is limited: a student cannot change her schoolmates while remaining at the same school. We refer to this new property as local non-bossiness and use it to provide a new characterization of DA that does not rely on stability. Furth...
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作者：Neuhann, Daniel; Sockin, Michael
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We analyze how public asset purchases affect liquidity, risk sharing and intertemporal smoothing in imperfectly competitive financial markets. Even neutral policies, such as budget-balanced trades of risk-free debt, affect liquidity and trading efficiency. Public debt purchases worsen liquidity and risk sharing by increasing price impact, while debt sales improve risk sharing but distort intertemporal trade. Expansionary quantitative easing policies can thus reduce trading efficiency. We also ...
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作者：Laiho, Tuomas; Salmi, Julia
作者单位：Aalto University; Hanken School of Economics
摘要：We study social learning in markets where a monopolistic seller and potential buyers learn from past buyers' reviews and experiences. Because buyers can wait before purchasing, they have an incentive to free-ride on information from other buyers. The seller has to take this informational externality between buyers into account in her pricing. Our main result is that any Markov perfect equilibrium is inefficient because of too little and too slow sales. This is contrary to the results absent le...
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作者：Kor, Ryan; Liu, Yi; Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Yale University; Monash University; Tsinghua University
摘要：We study the optimal joint intervention of a planner who can influence both the standalone marginal utilities of agents in a network and the weights of the links connecting them. The welfare-maximizing intervention displays two key features. First, when the planner's budget is moderate (yielding interior solutions), the optimal change in link weight between any pair of agents is proportional to the product of their eigen-centralities. Second, when the budget is sufficiently large, the optimal ...
