On the core of markets with co-ownerships and indivisibilities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sun, Xiang; Tang, Qianfeng; Xiao, Mingjun; Zhang, Jun
• 署名单位: Wuhan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Hubei University of Economics; Nanjing Audit University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2025.106135
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: allocation

摘要

Following Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019), we study the exchange of indivisible objects among agents with unit demand, where initially each object is either privately owned or is co-owned by multiple agents. We propose a new notion of core called the effective core for these problems to address the inadequacies of conventional notions of core. We say that a coalition effectively blocks an assignment if it weakly blocks it-as in the definition of the strong core-and the blocking is credible in the sense that no agent in the coalition takes any redundant object owned by a self-feasible subcoalition. We show that the effective core is a nonempty subset of the weak core and a superset of the strong core, and all assignments in it are Pareto efficient. We also propose a strategy-proof algorithm to find assignments in the effective core. Lastly, we make a detailed comparison between the effective core and Balbuzanov and Kotowski's exclusion core.