When can less be more? Inducing dealer responses in RFQ platforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yueshen, Bart Zhou; Zou, Junyuan
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; INSEAD Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106223
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Auctions; entry

摘要

We show in a model of RFQ trading that customers may admit only a few dealers, even when more are available, to induce maximum liquidity supply-less can be more. The number of admitted dealers is pinned down by a competition elasticity, shaped by dealers' cost to respond to RFQs. For example, higher search (operating) costs increase (reduce) admitted dealers. A social planner would mandate even fewer dealers than the market outcome, because customers induce excessive dealer competition. The model predicts endogenous market power, yields implications for regulation and design of electronic platforms, and speaks to customer-dealer interactions under market stress.