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作者：Pei, Harry
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of environments under which the patient player obtains at least his commitment payoff in all equilibria regardless of his stage-game payoff function. Due to the presence of interdependent values, the patient player cannot guarantee his mixed commitment payoff by imitating the ...
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作者：Morgan, John; Tumlinson, Justin; Vardy, Felix
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Exeter; University of Munich; International Monetary Fund
摘要：We show that meritocracy, in the sense of accuracy of performance ranking, can be too much of a good thing: in contests with sufficiently homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Szydlowski, Martin; Yoon, Ji Hee
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study a continuous-time principal-agent model in which the principal is ambiguity averse about the agent's effort cost. The robust contract generates a seemingly excessive pay-performance sensitivity. The worst-case effort cost is high after good performance, but low after bad performance, which leads to overcompensation and undercompensation respectively and provides a new rationale for performance-sensitive debt. We also characterize the agent's incentives when the contract is misspecifie...
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作者：Giordani, Paolo E.; Mariani, Fabio
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University; Luiss Guido Carli University; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：This paper provides a rationale for the revival of protectionism, based on the rise of the educated class. In a trade model with heterogeneous workers and entrepreneurs, globalization generates aggregate gains but has distributional effects, which can be attenuated through taxation. By playing a two-stage political game, citizens decide on trade openness and the extent of redistribution. In this setting, trade liberalization is politically viable as long as the losers from trade are compensate...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Muir, Ellen, V; Taylor, Peter G.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Stanford University; University of Melbourne
摘要：Traders that arrive over time give rise to a dynamic tradeoff between the benefits of increasing gains from trade by accumulating traders and the associated cost of delay due to discounting. We analyze this tradeoff in a dynamic bilateral trade model in which a buyer and seller arrive in each period and draw their types independently from commonly known distributions. With symmetric binary types, the optimal market clearing policy can be implemented with posted prices and ex post budget balanc...
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作者：Kuelpmann, Philipp; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Graz
摘要：We collected data on one-shot play for a representative selection of two-player two-and three-strategy games with unique and completely mixed strategy predictions and propose a new method to compare theo-ries of one-shot play out of treatment that allows a direct likelihood comparison: Competing theories are calibrated with pre-existing data using different games and subjects. Most theories in most treatments have predictive power. No theory is uniformly best. Considering risk aversion signifi...
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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Gao, Ying; Pei, Harry
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University
摘要：We analyze situations where players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player faces a sequence of short-run opponents. Before players act, the patient player announces their intended action after observing both a private payoff shock and a signal of what actions will be feasible that period. The patient player is either an honest type who keeps their word whenever their announced action is feasible, or an opportunistic type who freely chooses an...
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作者：Cheng, Ing-Haw; Hsiaw, Alice
作者单位：University of Toronto; Brandeis University
摘要：Why do individuals interpret the same information differently? We propose that individuals form beliefs following Bayes' Rule with one exception: when assessing the credibility of experts, they double-dip the data and use already-updated beliefs instead of their priors. This pre-screening mechanism explains why individuals jointly disagree about states of the world and the credibility of experts, why the ordering of signals and experts affects final beliefs, and when individuals over-or underr...
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作者：Han, Zhao; Tan, Fei; Wu, Jieran
作者单位：Saint Louis University; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics; Zhejiang University; Zhejiang University
摘要：We propose an approach to solving and analyzing linear rational expectations models with general information frictions. Our approach is built upon policy function iterations in the frequency domain. We develop the theoretical framework of this approach using rational approximation, analytic continuation, and discrete Fourier transform. Conditional expectations, which are difficult to evaluate in the time domain, can be calculated efficiently in the frequency domain. We provide the numerical im...
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作者：Gong, Aibo; Ke, Shaowei; Qiu, Yawen; Shen, Rui
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：We study strategic trading with a market maker who does not know the joint distribution of public information and an asset's value, and hence cannot interpret information properly. Following a public event, a probabilistically informed trader who knows the distribution and liquidity traders trade. The market maker adopts a robust linear pricing strategy that has the best worst-case payoff guarantee. We show that such a strategy is equivalent to a two-step learning procedure, and characterize t...
