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作者：Balbus, Lukasz; Reffett, Kevin; Wozny, Lukasz
作者单位：University of Zielona Gora; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Warsaw School of Economics
摘要：We prove existence of time consistent equilibria in a class of dynamic models with recursive payoffs and generalized discounting involving both behavioral and normative applications. Our generalized Bellman equation method identifies and separates both: recursive and strategic aspects of the equilibrium problem and allows to determine the sufficient assumptions on preferences and stochastic transition to establish existence. In particular we show existence of minimal state space stationary Mar...
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作者：Nishimura, Takeshi
作者单位：Komazawa University
摘要：We study bilateral trade with interdependent values as an informed-principal problem. The mechanism-selection game has multiple equilibria that differ with respect to principal's payoff and trading surplus. We characterize the equilibrium that is worst for every type of principal, and characterize the conditions under which there are no equilibria with different payoffs for the principal. We also show that this is the unique equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion. (C) 2022 Elsevier ...
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作者：Wang, Cheng; Yang, Youzhi
作者单位：Fudan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study a dynamic principal-agent/firm-CEO relationship that is subject simultaneously to moral hazard, limited commitment, and shocks to the CEO's market value. Termination is used as (a) an incentive instrument to punish the CEO for bad performance, (b) a cost minimization device that uses the CEO's outside value as an external means for compensation, and (c) as a means for replacing the incumbent CEO with a less expensive new CEO. Termination occurs after the CEO receives either a sufficie...
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作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil; Mishra, Debasis
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are opti-mal for selling two identical, indivisible objects to a single buyer. We analyze two settings: (i) decreasing marginal values (DMV) and (ii) increasing marginal values (IMV). Thus, the values of the buyer for the two units are not independent.We show that under a well-known condition on distribu...
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作者：Saponara, Nick
摘要：We model a decision maker (DM) making a choice under uncertainty who faces constraints on the set of contingencies she can consider, or reason about, when evaluating a given act (a mapping from states to outcomes). We model the DM's ability to reason about (coarse) contingencies when evaluating a given act using partitions of the state space. A key feature of the model is that the partition may vary with the act the DM is evaluating. This feature allows us to model a DM who, despite her inabil...
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作者：Meissner, Thomas; Pfeiffer, Philipp
作者单位：Maastricht University; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Timing premia measure how much consumption people are willing to forgo to resolve all consumption uncertainty immediately. We develop a novel experiment to elicit these attitudes directly in a model-free way. On average, subjects forgo around 5% of their total consumption to resolve all uncertainty immediately. Recursive utility models postulate a structural link between timing premia and deep preference parameters. We elicit these preference parameters separately and estimate corresponding pr...
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作者：Chen, Ying; Zapal, Jan
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from q committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy passes or paid up front. With transfer promises, the policy passes in equilibrium when the leader's gain from the policy is larger than the sum of the losses of the q members least opposed to the policy. Under non-unanimity rule, if the members are patient enough, the paymen...
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作者：Hu, Ju; Zhou, Zhen
作者单位：Peking University; Tsinghua University
摘要：We study information disclosure as a policy tool to minimize welfare losses in epidemics through mitigating healthcare congestion. We present a stylized model of a healthcare congestion game to show that congestion occurs when individuals expect the disease to be sufficiently severe and this leads to misallocation of scarce healthcare resources. Compared to full disclosure, under which congestion occurs when the true severity level surpasses the exhaustion level, a censorship policy, which poo...
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作者：Gehrig, Thomas; Ritzberger, Klaus
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Vienna; University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：This paper analyzes the role of intermediaries in providing immediacy in fast markets. Fast markets are modelled as contests with the possibility of multiple winners where the probability of casting the best quote depends on prior technology investments. Depending on the market design, equilibrium pricing by intermediaries involves a trade-off, between monopolistic price distortion and excess volatility. Since equilibrium at the pricing stage generates an externality, investments into faster t...
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作者：Tan, Serene
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper proposes a theory endogenizing the market structure when buyers' incomes are heterogeneous. Using a directed search model, ex ante identical firms choose the product quality of a good to sell and the target audience it wants to sell to, knowing only the income distribution of buyers. I show how the income distribution of buyers matters in determining the market structure. Segmentation of the product market by buyer income type can be obtained as an equilibrium phenomenon, but need n...
