The limits of meritocracy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Morgan, John; Tumlinson, Justin; Vardy, Felix
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Exeter; University of Munich; International Monetary Fund
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105414
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Contests; tournaments; Meritocracy; contest design

摘要

We show that meritocracy, in the sense of accuracy of performance ranking, can be too much of a good thing: in contests with sufficiently homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.