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作者：Piermont, Evan
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：I examine the structure of random choice resulting from random expected utility maximization and a tie-breaking rule. I provide a partial identification result, characterizing the set of random expected utility models that could have generated the observed choice frequencies. I then consider a particular class of random choice rules for which it is possible to constructively identify the consistent random utility model that produces indifference the least. These random choice rules are charact...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Rich, Patricia; Stecher, Jack
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Hamburg; University of Bayreuth; University of Alberta
摘要：We provide a theory of decision under ambiguity that does not require expected utility maximization under risk. Instead, we require only that a decision maker be probabilistically sophisticated in evaluating a subcollection of acts. Three components determine the decision maker's ranking of acts: a prior, a map from ambiguous acts to equivalent risky lotteries, and a generalized notion of certainty equivalent. The prior is Bayesian, defined over the inverse image of acts for which the decision...
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作者：Hansen, Lars Peter; Sargent, Thomas J.
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：A decision maker is averse to not knowing a prior over a set of restricted structured models (ambiguity) and suspects that each structured model is misspecified. The decision maker evaluates intertemporal plans under all of the structured models and, to recognize possible misspecifications, under unstructured alternatives that are statistically close to them. Likelihood ratio processes are used to represent unstructured alternative models, while relative entropy restricts a set of unstructured...
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作者：Choi, Kyoung Jin; Jeon, Junkee; Koo, Hyeng Keun
作者单位：University of Calgary; Kyung Hee University; Ajou University
摘要：We study the consumption and portfolio selection problem of economic agents who face consumption irreversibility: there is disutility from changing consumption levels. The derived preference exhibits loss aversion toward a consumption gamble with the previous consumption level being the reference point. The optimization problem involves a non-monotonic and non-concave utility function. We derive a closed-form solution by combining a duality method and the super-contact principle. We show that ...
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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Maestri, Lucas
作者单位：Boston College; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：A principal chooses when to terminate her relationship with an agent in a dynamic environment. The agent's type is his private information, and his actions are observed with noise. Both players are long-lived. We characterize the equilibrium payoffs and behavior of patient players by establishing an equivalence of equilibrium outcomes to the unique Nash equilibrium of a simple one-shot signaling game. A patient agent reveals virtually all information that influences the principal at the beginn...
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作者：Breig, Zachary
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：I study a dynamic model of monopoly sales in which a monopolist without commitment power interacts with a consumer whose valuation is private. I characterize equilibria of this game and show how the seller's strategy varies with initial beliefs. I find that the seller's payoffs under spot contracting can be higher than under commitment with renegotiation and that random delivery contracts can improve payoffs beyond posted prices.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Turchick, David; Xiong, Siyang; Zheng, Charles Z.
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo; University of California System; University of California Riverside; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：One of the proofs in Xiong and Zheng (2007) has a subtle mistake. This note provides a simple correction without changing the structure of the proof or altering any assumption in the said paper. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Matsuyama, Kiminori; Ushchev, Philip
作者单位：Northwestern University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：In existing models of endogenous innovation cycles, market size alters the amplitude of fluctuations without changing the nature of fluctuations. This is due to the ubiquitous assumption of CES homothetic demand system, implying that monopolistically competitive firms sell their products at an exogenous markup rate in spite of the empirical evidence for the procompetitive effect of entry and market size. We extend the Judd model of endogenous innovation cycles to allow for the procompetitive e...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Hofbauer, Josef
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Vienna
摘要：We present the family of Excess Payoff Dynamics for normal-form games, where the growth of a strategy depends only on its current proportion and the excess payoff, i.e., the payoff advantage of the strategy over the average population payoff. Requiring dependence only on the own excess payoff and a natural sign-preserving condition, the class essentially reduces to aggregate monotonic dynamics, a functional generalization of the Replicator Dynamics. However, Excess Payoff Dynamics also include...
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作者：Chen, Ying-Ju; Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Monash University; Tsinghua University
摘要：We develop a two-stage oligopolistic network competition model where, first, firms simultaneously de -termine their prices, and, second, consumers connected through a network determine their consumption. We show that firms price-discriminate consumers based on the consumer's network position. Denser networks (i.e., network topology) reduce prices, whereas increased competition (i.e., market structure) reduces prices only when competition is weak. However, the prices charged for the most influe...
