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作者：Atayev, Atabek
摘要：In many markets buyers are poorly informed about which firms sell the product (product availability) and prices, and therefore have to spend time to obtain this information. In contrast, sellers typically have a better idea about which rivals offer the product. Information asymmetry between buyers and sellers on product availability, rather than just prices, has not been scrutinized in the literature on consumer search. We propose a theoretical model that incorporates this kind of information ...
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作者：Lopomo, Giuseppe; Rigotti, Luca; Shannon, Chris
作者单位：Duke University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study surplus extraction in the general environment of McAfee and Reny (1992), and provide two alternative proofs of their main theorem. The first is an analogue of the classic argument of Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988), using geometric features of the set of agents' beliefs to construct a menu of contracts extracting the desired surplus. This argument, which requires a finite state space, also leads to a counterexample showing that full extraction is not possible without further significan...
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作者：Mackenzie, Andrew; Zhou, Yu
作者单位：Maastricht University; Kyoto University
摘要：We investigate menu mechanisms: dynamic mechanisms where at each history, an agent selects from a menu of his possible assignments. We consider both ex-post implementation and full implementation for a strengthening of dominance that covers off-path histories, and provide conditions under which menu mechanisms provide these implementations of rules. Our results cover a variety of environments, including matching with contracts, labor markets, auctions, school choice, marriage, object allocatio...
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作者：Fally, Thibault
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper examines demand systems where the demand for a good depends on other prices only through a common price aggregator (a scalar function of all prices). We refer to this property as generalized separability and provide the functional forms of demand that this property implies when demand is rational, i.e., derived from utility maximization. Generalized separability imposes restrictions on either income or price effects, and greater flexibility is obtained by adding indirect utility as ...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Le Yaouanq, Yves
作者单位：Yale University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; University of Munich; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We show how incorporating Gilboa et al.'s (2010) notion of objective rationality into the a-MEU model of choice under ambiguity can overcome several challenges faced by the baseline model without objective rationality. The decision-maker (DM) has a subjectively rationalpreference greater than or similar to(Lambda)which captures the complete ranking over acts the DM expresses when forced to make a choice; in addition, we endow the DM with a (possibly incomplete) objectively rationalpreference g...
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作者：Cres, Herve; Tvede, Mich
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of East Anglia
摘要：We study the formation of opinions in a bipartite network of firms' boards and directors theoretically. A director and a board are connected provided the director is a board member. Opinions are sets of beliefs about the likelihood of different states of the world tomorrow. Our basic assumption is that boards as well as directors aggregate opinions of each other: a production plan is better than another for a board (director) provided every director (board of which she is a member) finds it be...
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作者：Sargent, Thomas J.
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：The generalized multiple-prize nested lottery contest framework has been broadly applied to model noisy competitions that award prizes to multiple recipients. Assuming homogeneous and risk-neutral players, previous studies have typically solved for the symmetric strategy profile that satisfies the first-order condition as the equilibrium solution to the game. The literature has yet to formally establish equilibrium existence because of a technical challenge caused by the presence of multiple p...
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作者：Orlov, Dmitry
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：I consider a dynamic principal-agent model in which the agent does not observe the quality of his output and the principal chooses how much to monitor the agent. Monitoring improves production outcomes but can reduce the agent's incentive to work if it uncovers bad performance and leads to punishing the agent. The optimal monitoring intensity is path dependent: an agent who performed poorly in the past is monitored less going forward to reduce the risk of early termination. Conversely, an agen...
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作者：Xu, Jin; Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Shandong University; Monash University; Tsinghua University
摘要：We establish the general properties of equilibria (existence and uniqueness) in a very general model of interconnected multiplayer conflicts. In particular, under mild conditions on the cost function and the contest technology, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists and the set of Nash equilibria is convex. Furthermore, under the strong monotonicity of the cost function, the equilibrium is unique, regardless of the conflict structure. To establish these properties of equil...
