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作者：Klibanoff, Peter; Mukerji, Sujoy; Seo, Kyoungwon; Stanca, Lorenzo
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：The alpha-MEU model and the smooth ambiguity model are two popular models in decision making under ambiguity. However, the axiomatic foundations of these two models are not completely understood. We provide axiomatic foundations of these models in a symmetric setting with a product state space S-infinity. This setting allows marginals over S to be linked behaviorally with (limiting frequency) events. Bets on such events are shown to reveal the i.i.d. measures that are relevant for the decision...
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作者：Luo, Yulei; Nie, Jun; Wang, Haijun
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Kansas City; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper studies how the two types of uncertainty due to ignorance, parameter and model uncertainty, jointly affect strategic consumption-portfolio rules, precautionary savings, and welfare. We incorporate these two types of uncertainty into a recursive utility version of a canonical Merton (1971) model with uninsurable labor income and unknown income growth, and derive analytical solutions and testable implications. We show that the interaction between the two types of uncertainty plays a k...
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作者：Orlov, Dmitry
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Iconsider adynamic principal-agent model in which the agent does not observe the quality of his output and the principal chooses how much to monitor the agent. Monitoring improves production outcomes but can reduce the agent's incentive to work if it uncovers bad performance and lead stop unishing the agent. The optimal monitoring intensity is path dependent: anagent who performedpoorly in the pastis monitored less going forward to reduce the risk of early termination.Conversely,an agent who p...
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo; Hafalir, Isa E.; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Korea University; University of Technology Sydney; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：In school choice problems with weak priorities, the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism may pro-duce inefficient stable matchings due to tie-breaking. The stable-improvement-cycles (SIC) and choice -augmented deferred acceptance (CADA) mechanisms were proposed to remedy inefficiencies but they are manipulable. In a simple environment, we theoretically and experimentally analyze students' strategic be-havior when DA, SIC, and CADA are implemented. We show that obtaining the efficiency gain relat...
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作者：Kimya, Mert
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：We characterize the set of stable matchings when individuals are farsighted and when they choose their objections optimally along a farsighted objection path. We use a solution concept called maximal farsighted set (MFS), which is an adaptation of the concepts developed in Dutta and Vohra (2017) and Dutta and Vartiainen (2020) to one-to-one matching problems. MFS always exists, but it need not be unique. There is a unique largest MFS that contains all other, which is equal to the largest consi...
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作者：Giarlotta, Alfio; Petralia, Angelo; Watson, Stephen
作者单位：University of Catania; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; York University - Canada
摘要：Most bounded rationality properties in the literature are inherited by subchoices, but are not satisfied by at least one subchoice of most choice functions. Therefore the fraction of choice functions that can be explained by these models goes to zero as the number of items tends to infinity. Numerical estimates confirm the rarity of bounded rationality even for small sets of alternatives.(c) 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (ht...
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作者：Balbuzanov, Ivan
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：This paper generalizes the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) to matching markets with arbitrary constraints. The constraints are modeled as a set of permissible ex post allocations. A result of independent interest gives a simple geometric characterization of all lotteries over the set of permissible allocations: they are the ones that satisfy a collection of simple and tractable linear inequalities determined by the constraints. The inequalities correspond t...
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作者：Dong, Ding; Liu, Zheng; Wang, Pengfei; Zha, Tao
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Emory University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Housing demand shocks in standard macroeconomic models are a primary source of house price fluctuations, but those models have difficulties in generating the observed large volatility of house prices relative to rents. We provide a microeconomic foundation for the reduced-form housing demand shocks with a tractable heterogenous-agent framework. In our model with heterogeneous beliefs, an expansion of credit supply raises housing demand of optimistic buyers and boosts house prices without affec...
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作者：Pivato, Marcus
作者单位：Universite Bourgogne Europe; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：Let X be a connected metric space, and let >= be a weak order defined on a suitable subset of X-N. We characterize when >= has a Cesaro average utility representation. This means that there is a continuous real-valued function u on X such that, for all sequences x = (x(n))(n=1)(infinity) and y = (y(n))(n=1)(infinity) in the domain of >=, we have x >= y if and only if the limit as N ->infinity of the average value of u(x(1)), ...,u(x(N)) is higher than limit as N ->infinity of the average value...
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作者：Jeon, Jee Seon; Hwang, Ilwoo
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study an infinite-horizon multilateral bargaining game in which the status quo policy, players' recognition probabilities, and their voting weights are endogenously determined by the previous bargaining outcome. With players not discounting future payoffs, we show that the long-run equilibrium outcome features the concentration of power by one or two players, depending on the initial bargaining state. If the players' initial shares are relatively equal, they successfully prevent tyranny, bu...
