Reputation for playing mixed actions: A characterization theorem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pei, Harry
• 署名单位: Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105438
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Reputation; interdependent values; Supermartingales; Doob's Upcrossing Inequality

摘要

A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of environments under which the patient player obtains at least his commitment payoff in all equilibria regardless of his stage-game payoff function. Due to the presence of interdependent values, the patient player cannot guarantee his mixed commitment payoff by imitating the mixed commitment type, and small perturbations to a pure commitment action can significantly reduce the patient player's lowest equilibrium payoff. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.