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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We suggest a framework to analyse how sophisticated decision makers combine multiple sources of information to form predictions. In particular, we focus on situations in which: (i) Decision makers un-derstand each information source in isolation but are uncertain about the correlation between the sources; (ii) Decision makers consider a range of bounded correlation scenarios to yield a set of possible predic-tions; (iii) Decision makers face ambiguity in relation to the set of predictions they...
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作者：Do, Jihwan
作者单位：Wuhan University
摘要：This paper provides a theoretical explanation of cheating and compensation on-path of play using a canonical repeated game model of price-fixing collusion. The novel mechanism relies on firms playing mixed strategies allowing for both the monopoly price and undercutting the monopoly price to happen with positive probability, together with a compensation scheme that punishes a price-cutter. For an intermediate range of discount factors, the mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of equilibr...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.; Kojima, Fuhito; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Tokyo; Boston College
摘要：Interdistrict school choice programs-where a student can be assigned to a school outside of her district-are widespread in the US. We introduce a model of interdistrict school choice and present mechanisms that produce stable assignments. We consider four categories of policy goals on assignments and identify when the mechanisms can achieve them. By introducing a novel framework of interdistrict school choice, we provide a new avenue of research in market design. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rig...
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作者：Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Gulen, Huseyin; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Ozbay, Erkut Y.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We investigate experimentally preferences between different ambiguous processes generated by two-color Ellsberg urns. By providing symmetric information on urns with different numbers of beads and keeping the information on the most optimistic, pessimistic, and equal probability of winning possibilities the same, we elicit subjects' preferences for the size of an ambiguous urn. Subjects prefer the bets from the ambiguous urns with more beads. We analyze the role of ambiguity aversion and ratio...
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作者：Clark, Daniel; Fudenberg, Drew; He, Kevin
作者单位：Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of forward induction, because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play, and may not have enough data to rule out a strategy that opponents never use. Learning models also do not support the idea that the selected equilibria should only depend on a game's reduced normal form. However, playing the extensive form of a game is equival...
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作者：Kaya, Ayca; Vereshchagina, Galina
作者单位：University of Miami; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We analyze the optimal sorting of experts who differ in their ability to acquire information, into production teams. Once a team is formed, experts individually acquire information about the joint project, communicate the information they acquired, and then engage in team production. Misalignment of preferences at the production stage creates incentives for belief manipulation at the communication stage. We show that the cost associated with misaligned incentives is minimized if experts of sim...
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作者：Fernandez-Blanco, Javier
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：To study the constrained efficient public insurance provision against unemployment risks, we build a directed search model with households where a spouse's ability to provide consumption insurance determines the risks job-seekers take on. The planner's transfers to the unemployed fall with the spouse's income because of concave preferences with limited complementarity between consumption and the spouse's labor. Due to the absence of such a transfers scheme in the laissez-faire equilibrium, too...
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作者：Carre, Sylvain; Collin-Dufresne, Pierre; Gabriel, Franck
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD); Laboratoire dEconomie de Dauphine LEDa; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne
摘要：We consider a Kyle (1985) one-period model where insider trading may be subject to a penalty that is increasing in trade size. We characterize the solution - the equilibrium price and optimal trading strategy explicitly and establish existence and uniqueness for an arbitrary penalty function for the case of uniformly distributed noise. We use this framework to capture the difference between legal and illegal insider trading, and identify the set of 'efficient penalty functions' that would be o...
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作者：Christensen, Timothy M.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This paper derives primitive, easily verifiable sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of (stochastic) recursive utilities for several important classes of preferences. In order to accommodate models commonly used in practice, we allow both the state space and per-period utilities to be unbounded. For many of the models we study, existence and uniqueness is established under a single, primitive thin tail condition on the distribution of growth in per-period utilities. We present se...
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作者：Jung, Jin Yong
作者单位：Kangnam University
摘要：This study examines the effects of changes in an agent's preferences over income and effort on the principal's costs. The incentive cost is fundamentally affected by two factors: the income-effort marginal rate of substitution at the first-best wage, and the degree of absolute risk aversion around it. Thus, a resulting increase in the first-best wage has mixed effects because both factors are altered simultaneously. When the limited liability constraint does not bind and if the utility is conc...
