Distrust in experts and the origins of disagreement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cheng, Ing-Haw; Hsiaw, Alice
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; Brandeis University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105401
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Disagreement; polarization; learning; speculation; bubbles

摘要

Why do individuals interpret the same information differently? We propose that individuals form beliefs following Bayes' Rule with one exception: when assessing the credibility of experts, they double-dip the data and use already-updated beliefs instead of their priors. This pre-screening mechanism explains why individuals jointly disagree about states of the world and the credibility of experts, why the ordering of signals and experts affects final beliefs, and when individuals over-or underreact to new information. In a trading game, pre-screening generates excessive speculation, bubbles, and crashes. Our theory provides a micro-foundation for why individuals disagree about how to interpret the same data.(c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.