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作者：Chen, Jaden Yang
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This paper proposes a model of how biased individuals update beliefs in the presence of informational ambiguity. Individuals are ambiguous about the actual signal-generating process and interpret signals according to the model that can best support their biases. This paper provides a complete characterization of the limit beliefs under this rule. The presence of model ambiguity has the following effects. First, it destroys correct learning even if infinitely many informative signals can be obs...
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作者：Brandt, Felix; Saile, Christian; Stricker, Christian
作者单位：Technical University of Munich
摘要：The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem implies that all anonymous, Pareto-optimal, and single-valued social choice functions can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we investigate whether there exist social choice correspondences (SCCs), that satisfy these conditions under various assumptions about how single alternatives are eventually selected from the choice set. These assumptions include even-chance lotteries as well as resolute choice functions and linear tie-breaking orderings unknow...
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作者：Szoke, Balint
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：I estimate and evaluate a model with a representative agent who is concerned that the persistence properties of her baseline model of consumption and inflation are misspecified. Coping with model uncertainty, she discovers a pessimistically biased worst-case model that dictates her behavior. I combine interest rates and aggregate macro series with cross-equation restrictions implied by robust control theory to estimate this worst-case distribution and show that (1) the model's predictions abou...
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作者：Barsanetti, Bruno; Camargo, Braz
摘要：We study trade in dynamic decentralized markets with adverse selection. In contrast to the literature on the topic so far, we assume that the informed sellers make the offers so that signaling through prices is possible. We establish basic properties of equilibria, discuss the standard two-type case in detail, and then analyze the general finite-type case. We prove that market efficiency, measured by the maximum gains from trade in equilibrium, is invariant to trading frictions. Our analysis s...
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作者：Suzdaltsev, Alex
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：A seller chooses a reserve price in a second-price auction to maximize worst-case expected revenue when she knows only the mean of value distribution and an upper bound on either values themselves or variance. Values are private and iid. Using an indirect technique, we prove that it is always optimal to set the reserve price to the seller's own valuation. However, the maxmin reserve price may not be unique. Sometimes it is optimal to choose a deterministic reserve price even when randomization...
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作者：Hu, Yunzhi
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：This paper models a two-way dynamic feedback mechanism between bank lending standards and firm entry. The composition of the borrower pool affects banks' screening decisions and the credit terms they offer. Likewise, lending standards affect potential entrepreneurs' decisions to start new firms, varying the borrower pool. Firms delay borrowing when they wait for banks to finish screening or when they expect the borrower pool to improve soon. The model's predictions are consistent with basic fa...
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作者：Karni, Edi
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This paper proposes a theory-based model of decision-making under uncertainty the main premise of which is that predictions of the outcomes of acts are derived from theories. Realized act-outcome pairs provide information on the basis of which decision makers update their beliefs regarding the validity of the underlying theories. Consequently, acts are, simultaneously, information-generating initiatives, or experiments, that have material consequences. Experiments, that is, information-generat...
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作者：Kneeland, Terri
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for level-k implementation that apply in independent private value environments. These conditions establish a set of level-k incentive constraints that are analogous to Bayesian incentive constraints. We show that in two special environments, the level-k incentive constraints collapse down to Bayesian incentive constraints. We then show, via a bilateral trade application, that this is not a general implication. Bilateral trade is ex post efficient...
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作者：Hagen, Martin; Hernando-Veciana, Angel
作者单位：CUNEF Universidad; Durham University
摘要：A seller and a buyer bargain over the quantities and prices of multiple goods. Both agents have private information about their preferences. Utility is quasilinear in money. We show that a deterministic mechanism satisfies (i) dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, (ii) ex-post individual rationality and (iii) ex-post budget balance if and only if it is a posted-price mechanism. A similar, more general result holds if (iii) is replaced by ex-post collusion-proofness and a no-free lunch con...
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作者：Miralles, Antonio; Pycia, Marek
作者单位：University of Messina; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Zurich
摘要：We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environme...
