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作者：Chen, Enxian; Qiao, Lei; Sun, Xiang; Sun, Yeneng
作者单位：Nankai University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Wuhan University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept robust perfect equilibrium for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and also in pure strategies) and satisfy the important properties of admissibility, aggregate robustness, and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a la...
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作者：Hansen, Peter G.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：I introduce novel preference formulations which capture aversion to ambiguity about unknown and potentially time-varying volatility. I compare these preferences with Gilboa and Schmeidler's maxmin expected utility as well as variational formulations of ambiguity aversion. The impact of ambiguity aversion is illustrated in a simple static model of portfolio choice, as well as a dynamic model of optimal contracting under repeated moral hazard. Implications for investor beliefs, optimal design of...
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作者：He, Wei; Li, Jiangtao
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Singapore Management University
摘要：We study the design of auctions when the auctioneer has limited statistical information about the joint distribution of the bidders' valuations. More specifically, we consider an auctioneer who has an estimate of the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation but does not have reliable information about the correlation structure. We analyze the performance of mechanisms in terms of the revenue guarantee, that is, the greatest lower bound of revenue across all joint distributions tha...
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作者：Rabinovich, Stanislav; Wolthoff, Ronald
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of Toronto
摘要：We identify a misallocation inefficiency in search models, which is distinct from the aggregate entry dis-tortion emphasized in the previous literature, and arises instead from partially directed search. We consider a framework in which workers differ in whether they can direct their search, and firms are heterogeneous in productivity. The main result is that too many workers apply to high-productivity firms, relative to the social optimum. This occurs because too many firms attract only rando...
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作者：Araujo, A.; Vieira, S.; Parra, C.
作者单位：Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA); Getulio Vargas Foundation; Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro
摘要：In Schottmuller (2015), C. Schottmuller proposes a method for solving the principal's maximization problem. Using this method, he solves three examples. We show that the solutions presented in that paper are suboptimal. For each of the examples, we show how to build an optimal decision function that yields a larger expected payoff for the principal. These decision functions are monotonic but not strictly monotonic. Therefore, they open up the possibility of bunching. In addition, we identify t...
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作者：Chang, Dongkyu; Lee, Jong Jae
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Wuhan University
摘要：This paper studies a bargaining problem in which the buyer's valuation and outside option are private information. We show that there exists a non-stationary equilibrium in which the seller can secure full commitment profit (from the optimal sales mechanism that exhibits price skimming) if and only if the buyer's outside option takes a zero value with positive probability (non-negligibly zero outside option). Our innovation is to show that (i) both the Coasean reversion and positive selection ...
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作者：Horan, Sean; Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Bristol; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Deakin University
摘要：In a variety of choice environments, perception is both noisy and coarse. That is, the agent perceives the true ranking of the objects of choice with error; and, in addition, the perceived values can only be discriminated coarsely. Reasons for coarse perception include limitations in sensory perception, memory function, or the communication technology used by expert advisors. We model these two sources of error in terms of a random utility model with a discrimination threshold. In the limiting...
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作者：Luo, Xiao; Qiao, Yongchuan; Sun, Yang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Electronic Science & Technology of China; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：Dhillon and Mertens (1996) introduce the concept of perfect correlated equilibrium (PCE) and show, using an example, that the revelation principle fails for PCE -that is, a PCE distribution may not be generated by the canonical mechanism. This failure of the revelation principle jeopardizes its applications in economics. In this paper, we show that the revelation principle holds for an alternative notion of perfect correlated equilibrium that we dub correlated equilibrium with message-dependen...
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作者：Pivato, Marcus
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：How should we aggregate the ex ante preferences of Bayesian agents with heterogeneous beliefs? Suppose the state of the world is described by a random process that unfolds over time. Different agents have different beliefs about the probabilistic laws governing this process. As new information is revealed over time by the process, agents update their beliefs and preferences via Bayes rule. Consider a Pareto principle that applies only to preferences which remain stable in the long run under th...
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作者：da Costa, Carlos E.; Maestri, Lucas J.; Santos, Marcelo R.
作者单位：Insper
摘要：We study distributive and insurance policies in frictional labor markets where workers are privately informed about their abilities. The combination of selection and moral hazard constraints demands the use of new tax instruments that are redundant in frictionless labor markets to target vacancy creation. We characterize efficient allocations and derive new optimality conditions on effort and employment probability wedges. Wedges on both effort and vacancy creation are always positive at the b...
