Selling two identical objects

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bikhchandani, Sushil; Mishra, Debasis
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105397
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Multi-object auctions; revenue maximization; multidimensional mechanism design

摘要

It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are opti-mal for selling two identical, indivisible objects to a single buyer. We analyze two settings: (i) decreasing marginal values (DMV) and (ii) increasing marginal values (IMV). Thus, the values of the buyer for the two units are not independent.We show that under a well-known condition on distributions (due to McAfee and McMillan (1988)), (a) it is optimal to sell the first unit deterministically in the DMV model and (b) it is optimal to bundle (which is a deterministic mechanism) in the IMV model. Under a stronger sufficient condition on distributions, a deterministic mechanism is optimal in the DMV model.Our results apply to heterogeneous objects when there is a specified sequence in which the two objects must be sold.(c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.