Informed principal problems in bilateral trading

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nishimura, Takeshi
• 署名单位: Komazawa University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105498
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Informed principal; bilateral trade; interdependent values; Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson allocation; Intuitive criterion

摘要

We study bilateral trade with interdependent values as an informed-principal problem. The mechanism-selection game has multiple equilibria that differ with respect to principal's payoff and trading surplus. We characterize the equilibrium that is worst for every type of principal, and characterize the conditions under which there are no equilibria with different payoffs for the principal. We also show that this is the unique equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.