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作者：Bowen, Renee; Hwang, Ilwoo; Krasa, Stefan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Seoul National University (SNU); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We study bargaining between a fixed agenda-setter and responder over successive issues. If the responder rejects the setter's proposal, the setter can attempt to assert her will to implement her ideal and will succeed with a probability that depends on her personal power. Players learn about the setter's power as gridlock persists. Gridlock occurs when the setter's perceived power is either too high or too low, and the players reach compromise when the setter has moderate personal power. The p...
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作者：Oechssler, Joerg; Reischmann, Andreas; Sofianos, Andis
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：We present a new and simple mechanism for repeated public good environments. In the Conditional Contribution Mechanism (CCM), agents send two messages of the form, I am willing to contribute x units to the public good if in total y units are contributed. This mechanism offers agents risk-free strategies, which we call unexploitable. Our main theorem states that all outcomes of the CCM will eventually be Pareto efficient if agents choose unexploitable better responses. We conduct a laboratory e...
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作者：Gagnon-Bartsch, Tristan; Bushong, Benjamin
作者单位：Harvard University; Michigan State University
摘要：We examine errors in learning that arise when an agent who suffers attribution bias fails to account for her reference-dependent utility. Such an agent neglects how the sensation of elation or disappointment relative to expectations contributes to her overall utility, and wrongly attributes this component of her utility to the intrinsic value of an outcome. In a sequential-learning environment, this form of misattribution generates contrast effects in evaluations and induces a recency bias: th...
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作者：Kets, Willemien; Kager, Wouter; Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：University of Oxford; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Northwestern University
摘要：The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behav...
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作者：Erol, Selman; Vohra, Rakesh
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We propose a model of network formation where agent's payoffs depend on the connected component they belong to in a way that is specific enough to be tractable yet general enough to accommodate a number of economically relevant settings. Among them are formation in the presence of contagion via links and collaboration with spillovers. A key feature of this setting is that the externalities stem from links rather than nodes. We characterize stable and efficient networks. Under negative external...
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作者：Kashaev, Nail; Aguiar, Victor H.
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We generalize the stochastic revealed preference methodology of McFadden and Richter (1990) for fi-nite choice sets to settings with limited consideration. Our approach is nonparametric and requires partial choice set variation. We impose a monotonicity condition on attention first proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2020) and a stability condition on the marginal distribution of preferences. Our framework is amenable to statistical testing. These new restrictions extend widely known parametric model...
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作者：Safra, Zvi; Segal, Uzi
作者单位：University of Warwick; Boston College
摘要：We consider a risk averse decision maker who dislikes ambiguity as in the Ellsberg urns. We analyze atti-tudes to ambiguity when the decision maker is exposed to unrelated sequences of ambiguous situations. We discuss the Choquet expected utility, the smooth, and the maxmin models. Our main results offer conditions under which ambiguity aversion disappears even without learning and conditions under which it does not. An appendix analyzes compound gambles within the expected utility model and d...
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作者：Chatterjee, Kalyan; Guryev, Konstantin; Hu, Tai-Wei
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Bristol
摘要：A decision-maker faces a decision problem to choose an action, at a randomly determined time, to match an unknown state of nature. She has access to a sequence of signals partially informative of the current state of nature. The state of nature evolves according to a Markov chain. The decision-maker is subject to constraints on information-processing capacity, modelled here by a finite set of memory states. We char-acterize when optimal inference is possible with these constraints and, when it...
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作者：Auster, Sarah; Kellner, Christian
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Mannheim; University of Southampton
摘要：We study the properties of Dutch auctions in an independent private value setting, where bidders face uncertainty over the type distribution of their opponents and evaluate their payoffs by the worst case from a set of probabilistic scenarios. In contrast to static auction formats, participants in the Dutch auction gradually learn about the valuations of other bidders. We show that the transmitted information can lead to changes in the worst-case distribution and thereby shift a bidder's payof...
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作者：Herresthal, Claudia
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：A decision maker faces a choice to withdraw or to retain a product but is uncertain about its safety. An agent can gather information through sequential testing. Players agree on the optimal choice under certainty, but the decision maker has a higher safety standard than the agent. We compare the case where testing is hidden and the agent can choose whether to disclose his findings to the case where testing is observable. The agent can exploit the additional discretion under hidden testing to ...
