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作者：Brandl, Florian; Peters, Dominik
作者单位：University of Bonn; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：Approval voting allows every voter to cast a ballot of approved alternatives and chooses the alternatives with the largest number of approvals. Due to its simplicity and superior theoretical properties, it is a serious contender for use in real-world elections. We support this claim by giving eight characterizations of approval voting. All our results involve the consistency axiom, which requires choices to be consistent across different electorates. In addition, we consider strategyproofness,...
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作者：Lin, Yi-Hsuan
作者单位：Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：We consider a decision maker who first chooses a costly information structure, and then chooses an action after receiving a signal. The choice of action is observed, but the choice of information is not. Moreover, the state of nature is considered unobservable as well. In such a situation, the choice of action appears random and cannot be conditioned on the states from an outside analyst's point of view. We show that, given only stochastic choice from menus of actions, an analyst can identify ...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Auckland; University of Auckland; University of Auckland; University of Auckland
摘要：We model entry decisions of rival firms into a new market with uncertain common entry costs, potential product market competition, and experimentation. We show that a separating equilibrium, where firms enter only when they learn that the cost is low and are immediately followed by their rival, always exists. We also show the existence of pooling equilibria. In these equilibria, uninformed firms coordinate to enter at specific entry dates with positive probability and firms that learn that the...
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作者：Gorokhovsky, Alexander; Rubinchik, Anna
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Western Galilee Academic College
摘要：We propose a criterion for verifying whether an equilibrium of an overlapping-generations model is amenable to local policy analysis, i.e., is determinate. The criterion is applicable for a generic set of parameters of the model, and in case of indeterminacy, it indicates the nature of the problem: multiplicity of equilibria or their absence for near-by parameters. The criterion can be applied to models with infinite past and future as well as to those with a truncated past. The baseline equil...
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作者：Decamps, Jean-Paul; Villeneuve, Stephane
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study a dynamic model of a firm whose shareholders learn about its profitability and, face costs of external financing and costs of holding cash. The shareholders' problem involves a notoriously challenging singular stochastic control problem with a two-dimensional degenerate diffusion process. We solve it by means of an explicit construction of its value function, and derive a corporate life-cycle with two stages: a probation stage where it is never optimal for the firm to issue new shares...
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作者：Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
作者单位：Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos; Universidad de Valladolid
摘要：We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are...
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作者：[Anonymous]
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作者：Friedman, Daniel; Rabanal, Jean Paul; Rud, Olga A.; Zhao, Shuchen
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of Essex; Universitetet i Stavanger; Dongbei University of Finance & Economics
摘要：Absent coordinating signals from an exogenous benevolent agent, can an efficient correlated equilibrium emerge? Theoretical work in adaptive dynamics suggests a positive answer, which we test in a laboratory experiment. In the well-known Chicken game, we observe time average play that is close to the asymmetric pure Nash equilibrium in some treatments, and in other treatments we observe collusive play. In a game resembling rock-paper-scissors or matching pennies, we observe time average play c...
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作者：Pinter, Miklos
作者单位：Corvinus University Budapest; Budapest University of Technology & Economics
摘要：Taking advantage of ambiguity in strategic situations is well documented in the literature. However, so far there are only few results on how to make ambiguous strategies. In this paper we introduce a procedure which makes objective ambiguity, concretely it draws an element from a set of priors, defined by a belief function, in a way that it does not lead to any probability distribution over the priors. Moreover, we define the notion of ambiguous strategy, and by means of examples we show how ...
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作者：Deng, Liuchun; Khan, M. Ali; Mitra, Tapan
作者单位：Yale NUS College; Johns Hopkins University; Cornell University
摘要：In this paper, we offer necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of odd-period cycles and turbulence in a continuous unimodal interval map. The characterizations we present are original both to the economic and the mathematical literature, and go beyond existential assertions to easy verifiability. We apply our two theorems to six different canonical models in the literature on economic dynamics, all being grounded in the fact that their policy functions are given by continuous uni...
