Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Auster, Sarah; Kellner, Christian
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Mannheim; University of Southampton
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105072
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Auctions; ambiguity; Consistent planning

摘要

We study the properties of Dutch auctions in an independent private value setting, where bidders face uncertainty over the type distribution of their opponents and evaluate their payoffs by the worst case from a set of probabilistic scenarios. In contrast to static auction formats, participants in the Dutch auction gradually learn about the valuations of other bidders. We show that the transmitted information can lead to changes in the worst-case distribution and thereby shift a bidder's payoff maximizing exit price over time. We characterise the equilibrium bidding function in this environment and show that the arriving information leads bidders to exit earlier at higher prices. As a result, the Dutch auction systematically generates more revenue than the first-price auction. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.