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作者：Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun; Katsenos, Georgios; Ozdenoren, Emre
作者单位：Leibniz University Hannover; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; heSam Universite; ESCP Business School
摘要：We offer a model of scientific progress in which uncertainty resolves over time. We show that rivalry leads to less experimentation, extending results for preemption games to experimentation with uncertain outcomes. We compare experimentation duration and welfare when experimental outcomes are publicly versus privately observable. We show that public learning can generate more experimentation and higher welfare when uncertainty about the feasibility of a breakthrough is large; breakthroughs ar...
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作者：Roy, Souvik; Sadhukhan, Soumyarup
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur
摘要：We consider the problem of choosing a committee from a set of available candidates through a random-ized social choice function when there are restrictions on the committee to be formed and agents have separable preferences over the committees. We show that when the set of feasible committees is non -vacuously restricted, that is, cannot be seen as the set of all committees with a subset of members, a random social choice function is onto and strategy-proof if and only if it is random dictator...
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作者：Ishiguro, Shingo; Yasuda, Yosuke
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This study investigates optimal contracts to solve the moral hazard problem with subjective evaluation in a static environment with multiple agents wherein the principal observes agents' performances privately. Despite the limitations of feasible contracts that the principal can credibly offer, we show the irrelevance theorem that even under subjective evaluation, the principal can be as well off as if agents' performances are objective and verifiable, provided there are at least two risk-neut...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Laohakunakorn, Krittanai
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring under the assumption that the monitoring structure is endogenously chosen by the players in each period. We allow the players to choose from all possible monitoring structures. If the players disagree on the monitoring structure they would like, the realized monitoring structure is determined by a function that aggregates their choices. When one player can dictate the monitoring structure, then the repetition of the stage Nash is...
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作者：Chen, Yi; Jungbauer, Thomas; Wang, Zhe
作者单位：Cornell University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We propose a model of strategic delegation in professional labor markets in which big and fringe firms compete for heterogeneous workers. In this context, big firms decide whether to exercise their market power to suppress wages (wage suppression) or to delegate hiring to divisions, thereby committing to bidding more fiercely for more skilled workers (talent acquisition). This reduces the incentive for other firms to go toe -to-toe with the decentralizing firm. In equilibrium, a big firm comma...
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作者：Plan, Asaf
作者单位：University of Arizona
摘要：This paper regards symmetry in games with more than two players. It is often said that a two-player game is symmetric if it looks the same to both players. However, there are n-player games, such as Salop's circle model, that seem intuitively to look the same to all players, but do not meet the common definition of a symmetric n-player game. This paper proposes a more general symmetry condition that is satisfied by such models. Previous authors have established that games which are symmetric i...
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作者：Dong, Feng; Xu, Zhiwei
作者单位：Tsinghua University
摘要：We provide a theory to investigate the implications of time-varying bailout policy for rational bubbles in an infinite-horizon production economy. In particular, we ask two questions. First, should the government bailout asset bubbles? Second, if yes, how? In our model, firms face idiosyncratic investment opportunities and financial frictions, and creating new bubbles incurs real resources. Intrinsically useless assets can alleviate firms' credit constraints and enhance investment efficiency w...
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作者：Lavi, Ron; Shamash, Elisheva S.
作者单位：University of Bath; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a complete information game with multiple principals and multiple common agents. Each agent takes an action that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Prat and Rustichini (2003) who introduce this model assume classic contracts: each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by the agent. We define VCG contracts in which the monetary transfers to each agent additionally depend on all principals' offers, and study its effect on the existence ...
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作者：Dominiak, Adam; Tserenjigmid, Gerelt
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：In this paper, we study choice under growing awareness in the wake of new discoveries. The decision maker's behavior is described by two preference relations, one before and one after new discoveries are made. The original preference admits a subjective expected utility representation. As awareness grows, the original decision problem expands and so does the state space. Therefore, the decision maker's original preference has to be extended to a larger domain, and consequently the new preferen...
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作者：Phelan, Thomas; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We analyze equilibrium behavior and optimal policy within a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered epidemic model augmented with potentially undiagnosed agents who infer their health status and a social planner with imperfect enforcement of social distancing. We define and prove the existence of a perfect Bayesian Markov competitive equilibrium and contrast it with the efficient allocation subject to the same informa-tional constraints. We identify two externalities, static (individual actions affect ...
