Personal power dynamics in bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bowen, Renee; Hwang, Ilwoo; Krasa, Stefan
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Seoul National University (SNU); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105530
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Bargaining; Personal power; Gridlock; learning

摘要

We study bargaining between a fixed agenda-setter and responder over successive issues. If the responder rejects the setter's proposal, the setter can attempt to assert her will to implement her ideal and will succeed with a probability that depends on her personal power. Players learn about the setter's power as gridlock persists. Gridlock occurs when the setter's perceived power is either too high or too low, and the players reach compromise when the setter has moderate personal power. The presence of difficult issues can induce more compromise as the players have incentives to avoid testing the setter's power.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.