The value of a coordination game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kets, Willemien; Kager, Wouter; Sandroni, Alvaro
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105419
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: coordination; supermodular games; Value; Comparative statics on welfare; policy design; strategic complementarities

摘要

The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone's payoffs can reduce welfare. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.