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作者：Blume, Andreas; Deimen, Inga; Inoue, Sean
作者单位：University of Arizona; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Colgate University
摘要：We consider a principal's choice between either controlling an agent's action through an incomplete contract or guiding him through non-binding communication. The principal anticipates receiving private information and must hire an agent to take an action on her behalf. Contracts can only specify a limited number of actions as a function of the state. The principal is at liberty not to specify actions for some of the states. States not covered by the contract induce a communication game. Contr...
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作者：Wagner, Peter A.; Klein, Nicolas
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study social learning from actions and outcomes. Agents learn about future returns through privately observed signals, others' investment decisions and public experimentation outcomes when returns are realized. We characterize symmetric equilibria, and relate the extent of strategic delay of investments in equilibrium to the primitives of the information structure. Agents invest without delay in equilibrium when the most optimistic interim belief exceeds a threshold. Otherwise, delay in inv...
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作者：Shigeta, Yuki
作者单位：Tokyo Keizai University
摘要：This paper examines an Epstein-Zin recursive utility with quasi-hyperbolic discounting in continuous time. I directly define the utility process supporting the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation in the literature and consider Merton's optimal consumption-investment problem for application. I show that a solution to the HJB equation is the value function. The numerical and mathematical analyses show that un-like in the constant relative risk aversion utility, present bias in the Epstein-Zin...
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作者：Bavly, Gilad; Heller, Yuval; Schreiber, Amnon
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize's location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium that yields the first-best payoff (i.e., the highest social payoff under any strategy profile), and we characterize the first-best payoff. The results have interesting implica-tions for innovation contests and R&D races. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. A...
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作者：Lahkar, Ratul; Mukherjee, Sayan; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Ashoka University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：We consider a generalization of perturbed best response dynamics in population games with a continuum of strategies. The previous literature has considered the logit dynamic generated through the Shannon entropy as a deterministic perturbation. We consider a wider class of deterministic perturbations satisfying lower semicontinuity and strong convexity. Apart from the Shannon entropy, Tsallis entropy and Burg entropy are other perturbations that satisfy these conditions. We thereby generate th...
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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; Maccheroni, Fabio; Marinacci, Massimo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study how changes in wealth affect ambiguity attitudes. We define a decision maker as decreasing (resp., increasing) absolute ambiguity averse if he becomes less (resp., more) ambiguity averse as he becomes richer. Our definition is behavioral. We provide different characterizations of these attitudes for a large class of preferences: monotone and continuous preferences which satisfy risk independence. We then specialize our results for different subclasses of preferences. Inter alia, our c...
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作者：De Filippis, Roberta; Guarino, Antonio; Jehiel, Philippe; Kitagawa, Toru
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Paris School of Economics
摘要：In our laboratory experiment, subjects, in sequence, have to predict the value of a good. The second subject in the sequence makes his prediction twice: first (first belief), after he observes his predecessor's prediction; second (posterior belief'), after he observes his private signal. We find that the second subjects weigh their signal as a Bayesian agent would do when the signal confirms their first belief; they overweight the signal when it contradicts their first belief. This way of upda...
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作者：Zhou, Hang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper investigates the effect of strategic reasoning on financial markets with a level-k thinking framework. A level-k speculator performs k rounds of iterative reasoning to infer information from asset prices. In contrast to the static rational expectations equilibrium, the level-k framework produces a unified theory of momentum and contrarian trading strategies. Besides, this paper discusses how the distribution of sophistication levels affects several market variables and it sheds new ...
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作者：Hua, Xiameng; Watson, Joel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We add to the literature on long-term relationships with variable stakes and incomplete information by analyzing a discrete-time trust game between a principal and agent, with a continuum of types. In each period the principal selects the level of a project and the agent then decides whether to cooperate or betray; payoffs in the period scale with the level. The agent's benefit of betraying is privately known. The discrete-time framework allows for analysis of renegotiation in terms of an inte...
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作者：Kuvalekar, Aditya; Lipnowski, Elliot; Ramos, Joao
作者单位：University of Essex; Columbia University; University of Southern California; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：An expert advises a decision maker over time. With both the quality of advice and the extent to which it is followed remaining private, the players have limited information with which to discipline each other. Even so, communication in and of itself facilitates cooperation, the relationship evolving based on the expert's advice. We show a formal equivalence between our setting and one of cheap talk with capped money burning, enabling an exact characterization (at fixed discounting) of the expe...
