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作者：Echenique, Federico; Miyashita, Masaki; Nakamura, Yuta; Pomatto, Luciano; Vinson, Jamie
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Yale University; Yokohama City University
摘要：We propose a model of incomplete twofold multiprior preferences, in which an act f is ranked above an act g only when f provides higher utility in a worst-case scenario than what g provides in a best-case scenario. The model explains failures of contingent reasoning, captured through a weakening of the state by-state monotonicity (or dominance) axiom. Our model gives rise to rich comparative statics results, as well as extension exercises, and connections to choice theory. We present an applic...
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作者：Fernandez-Duque, Mauricio
作者单位：Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas A.C. (CIDE)
摘要：I develop a theory of group interaction in which individuals who act sequentially are concerned with conforming to what they believe is the majority attitude. Pluralistic ignorance may arise, an outcome with incomplete learning in which individuals conform to a mistaken sense of the majority attitude, earning the majority's disapproval. The degree of uncertainty about the population distribution of attitudes affects what individuals learn about the group. A central finding is that the learning...
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作者：Li, Qi
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper studies security design with adverse selection when verifiable retention is impossible due to market segmentation and price opacity across market segments. Rather than signaling through retention, sellers in the model signal quality through posted prices, which is feasible because the posted price affects buyers' search behavior and the equilibrium probability of selling. The optimal security design, in this case, is to break up the cash flow of an asset into several debt securities...
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作者：Goryunov, Maxim; Rigos, Alexandros
作者单位：Nazarbayev University; Lund University
摘要：We experimentally test theoretical predictions on equilibrium selection in a two-player coordination (investment) game. Through a minimal visual variation, our design prompts participants to play strategies whereby investing probability is either continuous or discontinuous in the payoff-relevant state. When participants use continuous strategies, average behavior is consistent with play in the risk-dominant equilibrium, the unique theoretical prediction. When they use discontinuous strategies...
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作者：Robson, Arthur; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Yale University
摘要：We examine the evolutionary selection of attitudes toward aggregate risk in an age structured population. Aggregate shocks perturb the population's consumption possibilities. Consumption is converted to fertility via a technology that exhibits first increasing and then decreasing returns to scale, captured in the simplest case by a fertility threshold. We show that evolution will select preferences that exhibit arbitrarily high aversion to aggregate risks with even very small probabilities of ...
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作者：Jindani, Sam
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：The folk theorem tells us that a wide range of payoffs can be sustained as equilibria in an infinitely repeated game. Existing results about learning in repeated games suggest that players may converge to an equilibrium, but do not address selection between equilibria. I propose a stochastic learning rule that selects a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated game in which payoffs are efficient. The exact payoffs selected depend on how players experiment; two natural specifications yield t...
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作者：Tamura, Yuki; Hosseini, Hadi
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：For object reallocation problems, if preferences are strict but otherwise unrestricted, the Top Trading Cycles rule (TTC) is the leading rule: It is the only rule satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. However, on the subdomain of single-peaked preferences, Bade (2019) defines a new rule, the crawler, which also satisfies these three properties. (i) The crawler selects an allocation by visiting agents in a specific order. A natural dual rule can be defined by pr...
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作者：Stark, Oded
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Warsaw
摘要：Fifty years ago Eytan Sheshinski constructed a composite measure of social welfare in which income per capita enters positively, and income inequality enters negatively: social welfare was defined as a strictly increasing function of the product of income per capita and one minus the Gini coefficient. In the case of a population of two persons whose incomes are distinct, Sheshinski states that social welfare depends only on the lower income, which reduces the social welfare function to the Raw...
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作者：Bobkova, Nina; Mass, Helene
作者单位：Rice University; University of Bonn
摘要：We analyze a social learning model where the agents' utility depends on a common component and an idiosyncratic component. Each agent splits a learning budget between the two components. We show that information about the common component is fully aggregated if and only if agents do not have to sacrifice learning about their idiosyncratic component in order to learn marginally about the common component. If agents vary in how much they value their idiosyncratic component, then the order of age...
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作者：Anufriev, Mikhail; Duffy, John; Panchenko, Valentyn
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We extend the beauty contest game to two dimensions: each player chooses two numbers to be as close as possible to certain target values, which are linear functions of the averages of the two number choices. One of the targets depends on the averages of both numbers, making the choices interrelated. We report on an experiment where we vary the eigenvalues of the associated two-dimensional linear system and find that subjects can learn the Pareto-optimal Nash Equilibrium of the system if both e...
