Noise-proof equilibria in two-action signaling games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Carlsson, H; Dasgupta, S
署名单位：
Lund University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1997.2329
发表日期：
1997
页码：
432-460
关键词：
摘要：
An equilibrium of a signaling game is noise-proof if it survives a small perturbation of the Receiver's perception of the signal. We derive conditions for noise proofness and prove existence for signaling games where the Receiver has two actions, the message space is a real interval, and standard monotonicity conditions are met. Such ames have a continuum of equilibria which satisfy the never-a-weak-best-reply criterion (NWBR), but often a unique noise proof equilibrium. Every noise-proof equilibrium satisfies NWBR and is insufficiently revealing: With some probability the Receiver chooses an action which would be suboptimal under full information. (C) 1997 Academic Press.