-
作者：Raith, M
摘要：Under which conditions do oligopolists have an incentive to share private information about a stochastic demand or stochastic costs? We present a general model which encompasses virtually all models of the existing literature on information sharing as special cases. Within this unifying framework we show that in contrast to the apparent inconclusiveness of previous results some simple principles determining the incentives to share information can be obtained. Existing results are generalized, ...
-
作者：Bond, EW; Wang, P; Yip, CK
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：We examine a two-sector endogenous growth model with general constant-return-to-scale production technologies governing the evolution of human and physical capital. We prove the existence, uniqueness, and saddle-path stability of the balanced growth equilibrium. A dual approach drawing on techniques from international trade theory is used to provide complete characterization of the transitional dynamics of consumption, goods and education outputs, human and physical capital inputs, and the rel...
-
作者：Maniquet, F
摘要：Assume that a set of individuals commonly own a one input one output technology. Al an average cost pricing equilibrium allocation, the consumption/contribution ratio is identical among agents and each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. The following requirement is introduced: every agent must be as well off at a selected allocation as at the average cost equilibrium that all agents prefer. The paper establishes compatibilities and incompatibilities between this requirement and some...
-
作者：Burguet, R
摘要：A buyer repeatedly purchases some good. Suppliers privately learn their cost only upon producing at least once. Efficiency would imply sampling sellers until one is found with cost lower than a (increasing with time) reservation value. Then the good would be permanently purchased from the seller with lowest cost. A sequence of second-price auctions with participation premia and entry fees is shown to be both efficient and optimal for the buyer. An alternative calls for price offers by informed...
-
作者：Konishi, H
摘要：This paper proves a general existence theorem for equilibrium in a local public good economy with free mobility by extending Greenberg and Shitovitz's (J. Econ. Theory 46, 1988, 223-236) approach. Each jurisdiction's collective choice rule is the d-majority voting rule proposed by Greenberg (Econometrica 47, 1979, 627-636). Spillover effects of local public goods, externalities due to the population distribution, and snob effects are all allowed. We need transitivity and completeness of prefer...
-
作者：Prechac, C
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
摘要：This note provides an alternative proof of a recent result of Balasko, Cass, and Shell, namely that the set of regular symmetric economies of a sunspot model with complete markets coincides with the set of regular economics of the underlying model without uncertainty. Besides being more elementary, our proof provides additional information on the structure of the set of critical equilibria. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
-
作者：Prechac, C
摘要：We introduce a financial intermediary into the stationary OLG model and investigate the efficiency of the selection procedure based on the maximisation of its commisions. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
-
作者：Bottazzi, JM; Hens, T
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Bonn; Stanford University
摘要：This paper is aimed al characterizing excess demand functions around noncritical spot price systems in two-period exchange economies with incomplete markets and real assets. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
-
作者：Aoyagi, M
摘要：The paper studies a repeated game in which a long-run player without discounting faces another long-run player with strict discounting. The game is perturbed so that there is uncertainty in the patient player's strategy choice: she may be a rational player. but she may also be one of many irrational types who are committed to various repeated game strategies, The rational patient player's equilibrium payoff in this perturbed game is analyzed. In particular, it is shown that the lower bound on ...
-
作者：Eichberger, J; Kelsey, D
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Birmingham
摘要：In this paper we show that while individuals with non-additive beliefs may display a strict preference for randomisation in an Anscombe-Aumann framework, they will not do so in a Savage style decision theory. Moreover they will be indifferent to randomisation, unless they have strict preferences between two randomising devices with the same probabilities. We argue that this is related to the distinction between one- and two-stage Choquet integrals. We believe our result will have implications ...
